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I. Introduction
Discovery has been the core controversy in our civil proce-
dure jurisprudence for over sixty years. Among all provisions in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' the discovery provisions
have been most frequently amended. 2 Of all the discovery
amendments, the mandatory disclosure amendments have been
the most controversial. They rest on a notion which is antago-
nistic to the deep-rooted philosophy of the adversary system,3
and they contravene the FRCP's fundamental character of tran-
substance. 4 Moreover, they divide the uniform world of federal
courts into intricate and diverse practices among different dis-
tricts,5 which is directly repugnant to the ideal of uniform prac-
tice held by the framers of the FRCP.6
Mandatory disclosure entered the discovery system as part
of the 1993 FRCP amendments. While some commentators sug-
gest that the amendments were inspired by distortion of actual
discovery practice and motivated by a political agenda, 7
1. FED. R. Civ. P. [hereinafter FRCP].
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 advisory committee's note.
3. See discussion infra Part I.A and accompanying text.
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(E) (proposed June 30, 1998), reprinted in 119 S.
Ct. 1, 36. The proposed amendment to Rule 26(a)(1) exempts eight types of cases
from mandatory disclosure. See id.
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). Under the current rule, district courts are al-
lowed to opt out of the mandatory disclosure rule. See id.
6. See discussion infra Part II.A and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Symposium on Civil Justice Reform: Discovery
in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Conse-
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss1/4
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
mandatory disclosure was intended to cure the problems associ-
ated with discovery, i.e., the prolonged process, the high costs,
and asserted abuse, by "accelerat[ing] the exchange of basic in-
formation about the case and eliminat[ing] the paper work in-
volved in requesting such information."8 Under Rule 26(a)(1)
both parties must disclose certain 'core information.' 9 This in-
cludes information which must be turned over at the outset of
litigation without formal discovery requests, such as the iden-
tity of witnesses likely to have discoverable information, the
documents relevant to disputed facts, the computation of dam-
ages, and any insurance agreements.' 0 In addition, parties are
not allowed to initiate formal discovery until they "meet and
confer" in compliance with Rule 26(f).1" The basic idea of
mandatory disclosure was to facilitate the communication of
'core information' between the parties and to eliminate the need
for certain discovery activities, thereby accomplishing the goals
of reducing discovery costs and facilitating the early disposition
of cases.' 2
Despite the commendable goals of mandatory disclosure,
the amendments triggered extensive and forceful opposition.' 3
This is evident in the fact that the Supreme Court, normally
passive in the rulemaking process, promulgated the mandatory
disclosure provision by only a 6-3 margin.' 4 Three Justices
voiced their strong objections through Justice Scalia's dissent-
quences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994) (arguing that
the amendment was founded on the myth of American litigiousness and pervasive
discovery abuse, originating from questionable social science, and describing how
politicians used the media to disseminate this myth).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (discussing 1993 amendment
to Rule 26(a)(1)).
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
10. See id.
11. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1993) ("In the meantime,
the present revision puts in place a series of disclosure obligations that . . . are
designed to eliminate certain discovery, help focus the discovery that is needed,
and facilitate preparation for trial or settlement.").
13. See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to
Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 21-39 (1992) (describing the rulemaking process in rela-
tion to the strong critics on the proposed rules).
14. See 146 F.R.D. 402, 507-13 (1993) (6-3 decision) (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J. and Souter, J., dissenting as to Part II).
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ing statements. 15 The arguments against mandatory disclosure
range from concerns about the adversary system to claims of
increasing costs and delays. 16 Critics continually argue that the
notion of mandatory disclosure departs from the deep-rooted
foundation of the Anglo-American adversary system, increases
discovery costs, and prolongs case disposition. 17
These powerful criticisms prompted a compromise which
allows the district courts to "opt-out" of the mandatory disclo-
sure rule, an unprecedented practice since the adoption of the
FRCP in 1938.18 Since the adoption of the mandatory disclosure
rule, the federal courts are no longer a unitary entity. 19 A great
majority of district courts have either adopted their own partic-
ular rules regulating discovery practices or "opted-out" of
mandatory disclosure. 20
Despite the pressures prompting the creation of the "opt-
out" rule, the compromise rule did not end the arguments about
mandatory disclosure.21 Fierce disputes continue among schol-
ars, practicing attorneys, and judges with regard to the conse-
quences of mandatory disclosure. 22 These arguments can be
classified into three main categories: a traditional legal analy-
sis, a law and economics analysis, and an empirical analysis. 23
Also, most of the literature opposing mandatory disclosure chal-
lenges the wisdom of introducing such a device. As a result, the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules requested the Rand Insti-
tute for Civil Justice and the Federal Judicial Center to conduct
15. See id.
16. See discussion infra Parts II-II.
17. See discussion infra Parts II-III.
18. See D. STIENSTRA, IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN UNITED STATES Dis-
TRICT COURTS, WITH SPECIFIC ATrENTION TO COURTS' RESPONSES TO SELECTED
AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 (Federal Judicial Center
March 30, 1998) (introducing the different rules governing the disclosure among
different district courts); see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The
Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 757, 758 (1995) ("Almost no one
is heard to offer support for the notion that the fundamental decision made in 1938
ought to be reversed.").
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See discussion infra Parts II-IV.
22. See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to
Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 21-39 (1992) (describing the rulemaking process in rela-
tion to the strong critics on the proposed rules).
23. See infra Parts II, III, and IV.
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two empirical studies on the influences and effects of
mandatory disclosure.24 As a ramification of these two stud-
ies, 25 the Advisory Committee proposed to further amend the
mandatory disclosure rule by limiting its scope and by eliminat-
ing the "opt-out" provision to restore uniform practice within
federal courts.26 These proposed rules currently have been ap-
proved by the Judicial Conference and are pending before the
Supreme Court.27
This Article reviews the arguments surrounding
mandatory disclosure and analyzes their respective merits.
Section II discusses the traditional legal arguments pertaining
to mandatory disclosure, including its relation to the adversary
system, its impact on information production, and the satellite
litigation anticipated to develop from mandatory disclosure.
Section III analyzes the influence of mandatory disclosure from
a legal and economic perspective on three topics: settlement
rates, litigation costs, and strike suits under the mandatory dis-
closure scheme. Section IV assesses two empirical studies of
mandatory disclosure, the Rand report28 and the FJC report,29
finding these reports to be inconclusive. Finally, this Article
conducts an independent empirical study and reports its result
in Section V. This new empirical study tests the impact of
mandatory disclosure on settlement rates as well as on time to
case disposition. There is no evidence showing that mandatory
24. See Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules to Honorable Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure (June 30, 1998) quoted in 119 S. Ct. 1, 1-20.
25. See 119 S. Ct. 1, 34-41 (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) (listing proposed amendment to Rule 26(a)).
26. See id. The proposed Rule 26(a)(1) limits the scope of mandatory disclo-
sure to information supporting the disclosing party's position, while the current
Rule 26(a)(1) requires parties to disclose information relevant to disputed facts
alleged with particularity in the pleadings whether it supports or damages the
disclosing party's position. See id.
27. See Judicial Conference Approves Proposed Amendments To Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Evidence, and Bankruptcy, 68 U.S.L.W. 2161 (Sept. 28, 1999).
28. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY
MANAGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION
DATA (1998) [hereinafter RAND REPORT I].
29. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, DISCOVERY AND
DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NA-
TIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES (1997) [hereinafter
FJC REPORT].
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disclosure accomplished its intended goal. The criticism that
mandatory disclosure would reduce settlement rates is also un-
founded. Nevertheless, because of the systematic waste and un-
necessary costs of mandatory disclosure, this Article argues
that it is desirable to eliminate mandatory disclosure.
II. Traditional Legal Arguments
A. Adversary System
A fundamental objection to mandatory disclosure lies in its
incompatibility with the American adversary system. 30 A pri-
mary example of such an argument is found in Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion to the 1993 Amendment to Rule 26 of the
FRCP:31 "The proposed new regime does not fit comfortably
within the American judicial system, which relies on adver-
sarial litigation to develop the facts before a neutral deci-
sionmaker."32 The gravamen of this objection is that mandatory
disclosure forces one party to volunteer the information he has
and, as a consequence, helps the opposing party prepare his
case.
33
A survey of the origin of mandatory disclosure reveals that
mandatory disclosure was clearly intended to correct the
problems of the adversary system in the pretrial phase.34 How-
ever, a closer inquiry into the historical background and basic
philosophy of the discovery system reveals that this is not the
whole story.35 The challenge to the adversary system did not
originate with mandatory disclosure, but rather can be traced to
the birth of the whole discovery system.36 To suggest that
mandatory disclosure violates the spirit of the adversary system
is to obscure the real focus of the controversy. The real issue is
whether mandatory disclosure pushed civil litigation further
away from the pure "sporting theory" of the adversary system
than discovery did.
30. See discussion infra Part II.A.
31. See 146 F.R.D. 402, 511 (1993).
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. See generally Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversarial Character of Civil Discov-
ery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978).
35. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
36. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
208 [Vol. 21:203
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1. The Root of Controversy-The Attack on Adversary
Character in the Pretrial Phase
It has been widely recognized that the idea of mandatory
disclosure came from two law review articles. 37 The two authors.
also played an important role in implementing this idea in the
1993 FRCP amendments. 38 These two authors, Wayne D. Bra-
zil and William W. Schwarzer, challenged the appropriateness
of the adversary nature of the pretrial process and advocated to
transform it into a non-adversary system. 39 These ideas formed
the basic philosophical foundation of their mandatory disclosure
proposals.40
In his influential law review article entitled The Adversary
Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for
Change, Brazil argued that the adversary character of discovery
inevitably imposes gamesmanship and undue burdens on civil
litigation. 41 Consequently, only a fundamental shift from its ad-
versarial nature could bring about meaningful reform.42 Brazil
posited that the purpose of discovery is to ascertain the truth of
disputed facts and to end gamesmanship in litigation. The
means to accomplish this is the facilitation of the mutual ex-
change of information and evidence relevant to the disputed
facts.43 Brazil cited numerous authorities to support the posi-
tion that discovery was intended to end the "sporting theory" of
justice and to search for truth through full disclosure of all rele-
vant facts without regard to which party was in possession of
37. See Brazil, supra note 34. See also William W. Schwarzer, The Federal
Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PiTT. L. REV. 703
(1989).
38. See Bell et al., supra note 13, at 17 (Brazil and Judge Schwarzer were the
main promoters of mandatory disclosure in the 1993 amendments). Professor Bra-
zil became a member of Advisory Committee in 1988 and Judge Schwarzer was
appointed as Director of the Federal Judicial Center.
39. See generally Brazil, supra note 34. See also Schwarzer, supra note 37.
40. See generally Brazil, supra note 34. See also Schwarzer, supra note 37.
41. See Brazil, supra note 34, at 1296-97 ("The adversary structure of the dis-
covery machinery creates significant functional difficulties for, and imposes costly
economic burdens on, our system of dispute resolution. Because these difficulties
and burdens are an inevitable consequence of adversary relationships and compet-
itive economic pressures, they cannot be removed by the kind of limited, nonstruc-
tural discovery reforms . . ").
42. See id. at 1296-97.
43. See id. at 1298-99.
20001 209
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the evidence.4 Brazil further argued that "the unarticulated
assumption underlying the modern discovery reform movement
was that the gathering and sharing of evidentiary information
should, and would, take place in an essentially nonadversarial
environment."45 Brazil observed, however, that devices within
the discovery scheme still led parties to take an adversarial pos-
ture during discovery 46 and that economic incentives still drove
attorneys to continue the gamesmanship in pursuit of their cli-
ents' interests.47 Brazil claimed that the "adversary pressure
and the competitive economic impulses inevitably work to im-
pair significantly, if not to frustrate completely, the attainment
of the discovery system's primary objectives." 48 Brazil con-
cluded that "discovery cannot serve effectively its intended pur-
poses unless substantial changes are made both in the
environment in which it is conducted and in the extent and
quality of judicial control over its processes."49
In order to change the basic character of discovery from ad-
versarial to non-adversarial, Brazil proposed to alter the attor-
neys' roles and obligations during the pretrial process. 50 Under
his proposal, attorneys should play the role of the courts' of-
ficers instead of their clients' partisan advocates. 51 Accordingly,
their loyalty should shift from their clients' partisan interests to
the courts' search for the truth.52 To achieve this goal, Brazil
proposed new rules for civil procedure and professional ethics
tailored to these changes. 53 More significantly, his reform pack-
age included narrowing the scope of the attorney-client privi-
44. See id. at 1299-1303.
45. Id. at 1303.
46. See Brazil, supra note 34, at 1304 ("[Discovery] also has provided attor-
neys with new weapons, devices, and incentives for the adversary gamesmanship
that discovery was designed to curtail.") (alteration in original) and 1315-31
(describing how attorneys use discovery tools to distort the facts and obtain an
unjust victory).
47. See id. at 1304 ("Attorneys conducting discovery still are commanded by
the rules of professional responsibility and by their own economic self-interest to
commit their highest loyalty to their clients' best interests.").
48. Id. at 1303.
49. Id. at 1348.
50. See id. at 1349.
51. See Brazil, supra note 34, at 1349.
52. See id.
53. See id.
210 [Vol. 21:203
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lege and the work product. doctrine.54 However, the most
extreme aspect of his proposal was to increase judicial involve-
ment in the truth-finding process to the extent that the court
should be authorized to investigate evidence on its own
initiative. 55
A decade later, William W. Schwarzer joined Brazil in chal-
lenging the adversarial nature of the discovery process in his
law review article entitled The Federal Rules, The Adversary
Process, and Discovery Reform.56 Schwarzer made two major
arguments which supported his position. The first argument fo-
cused on all aspects of the adversary process, including the
presence of a neutral tribunal, the preparation and presenta-
tion of the case by the parties, and a structured procedural sys-
tem to find the truth.57 These aspects do not, or should not,
exist in the process of discovery because (1) the judges under
the FRCP are managerial rather than uninformed and impar-
tial,58 (2) giving parties the control over case representation and
preparation invites partisan misconduct and gamesmanship,5 9
and (3) discovery with an adversarial character frustrates
rather than promotes the truth-finding function.60
The second argument emphasizes the attorney's conflicting
and tension-producing obligation under the system of adver-
sarial discovery. The attorney must balance his duty to disclose
truthful information with his duty to protect his client's best
interest.61 Accordingly, Schwarzer concluded that "the truth-
finding mechanisms of the adversary process, for the most part,
do not function during discovery and pretrial. But the adver-
54. See id. at 1351 ("It is important to note, however, that meaningful disclo-
sure probably could not be accomplished without significantly narrowing the cur-
rent reach of both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.").
55. See id. at 1357. A court should be empowered, for example, to pose written
or oral questions to parties, witnesses, or attorneys whenever the court is unsatis-
fied with the quality or comprehensiveness of questions propounded by counsel.
Similarly, a court on its own initiative should be able to request admissions of facts
and the production of documents from parties. See id.
56. See generally William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary
Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 703 (1989).
57. See id. at 706 (adopting Professor Lon Fuller's criteria for an adversary
system).
58. See id. at 706-08.
59. See id. at 709-12.
60. See id. at 712-13.
61. See Schwarzer, supra note 37, at 713-16.
20001 211
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sarial habits engendered by the process remain, and at this
stage they are counter-productive." 62 In order to restore the ul-
timate goal of truth-finding, however, the emphasis should be
placed upon the objective of seeking the truth, rather than on
the process of discovery. 63 Accordingly, Schwarzer proposed a
structure under which parties would be obliged to disclose all
relevant information automatically, prohibiting further discov-
ery unless ordered by the court.64
Putting the two proposals together, it is clear that their ul-
timate objective was to completely overturn the adversary rela-
tionship during the pretrial stage, transforming the process into
a cooperative, truth-seeking relationship between the plaintiff,
the defendant, and the court. 65 While there are substantial
doubts about the feasibility of these proposals, 66 it is not this
Article's purpose to examine these questions. Rather, the pur-
pose of tracing the root of mandatory disclosure is to show the
gap between the proposed model and the disclosure rules which
were actually adopted, and to evaluate the merits of the criti-
cism based on inconsistency with the adversary system.
A comparison between the authors' proposed rules and the
current mandatory disclosure rule reveals that the 1993
Amendments adopted only the form of the proposal without em-
bracing its essential substance.67 As a result, all devices that
cause adversarial discovery battles have remained intact.68
Also, the attorney-client privilege and the work product doc-
62. Id. at 713.
63. See id. at 721 ("One approach might be to restructure the existing discov-
ery rules by shifting the emphasis from discovery-the process-to disclosure-the
objective.").
64. See id. at 721-22 (articulating the basic rules and principles under his
proposal).
65. Compare Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversarial Character of Civil Discovery:
A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1348 (1978) with William
W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform,
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703 (1989).
66. For example, how to mitigate the attorneys' economic pressure to act im-
partially, and what incentives exist in their scheme to motivate both parties to
objectively search the truth.
67. Compare Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversarial Character of Civil Discovery:
A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1348 (1978) and William
W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform,
50 U. PIr. L. REV. 703 (1989) with FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
68. See supra note 67.
212 [Vol. 21:203
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trine have maintained their original scope. Thus, the attorney's
principal duty is still owed to the client, not to the court. The
attorneys, as paid warriors, continue to fight the battles associ-
ated with mandatory disclosure. Likewise, the features of the
adversary system remain pervasive in the disclosure phase as
well as in the discovery phase.69 This persistence may be attrib-
utable to the criticisms engendered by the proposals of Brazil
and Schwarzer.
In fact, the only significant change made by the mandatory
disclosure rule is that it places an additional tier upon the dis-
covery system. 70 It does not fundamentally alter the adversary
system. While it may be argued that mandatory disclosure
pushed the pretrial process away from the adversary system, it
is important to recognize that this departure actually originated
in the discovery system.71 This departure was the fundamental
basis for the entire discovery scheme. 72 To suggest that
mandatory disclosure violates the American procedural orienta-
tion of the adversary system is to obscure the real issue.
2. The Real Focus of Controversy-The Difference Between
Discovery and Disclosure
The historical background 73 and the intended purpose of
discovery74 illustrate that discovery was designed to cure the
deficiencies of the adversary system. Before the adoption of the
FRCP in 1938, the "sporting theory" of justice under the adver-
sary system had been widely criticized as causing gamesman-
ship and jeopardizing the finding of the truth.75 One of the most
69. See supra note 67.
70. See generally, Bell et al., supra note 13, at 48.
71. See discussion infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
72. See discussion infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
73. See discussion infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
74. See discussion infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 40 American Law Review 729, 738-39 (1906), quoted in
WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 10 (1968):
[The sporting theory of justice] leads the most conscientious judge to
feel that he is merely to decide the contest, as counsel present it, according
to the rules of the game, not to search independently for truth and justice.
It leads counsel to forget that they are officers of the court and to deal with
the rules of law and procedure exactly as the professional football coach
with the rules of the sport. It leads to exertion to 'get error into the record'
2000] 213
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important objectives of the FRCP was to correct these
problems. 76 Among all the devices within the FRCP, discovery
was thought to be the most effective to achieve this goal. The
drafters of the discovery rule state:
It is probable that no procedural process offers greater opportuni-
ties for increasing the efficiency of the administration of justice
than that of discovery before trial. Much of the delay in the prep-
aration of a case, most of the lost effort in the course of the trial,
and a large part of the uncertainty in the outcome, result from the
want of information on the part of litigants and their counsel as to
the real nature of the respective claims and the facts upon which
they rest.77
The significance of pretrial discovery expansion was
pointed out by a commentator who stated that "[a]mong the
most fundamental and most promising reforms of the adversary
system in modem times has been the expansion of pretrial dis-
covery."78 Aimed at ameliorating the adversary system, discov-
ery pioneered the departure from the traditional rival
relationship between the two parties. Under discovery, each
party is entitled to demand that the other party provide infor-
mation or documents as long as they are relevant to the subject
of the litigation, are not privileged, and the other party is
obliged to disclose them.79
rather than to dispose of the controversy finally and upon its merits. It
turns witnesses, and especially expert witnesses, into partisans pure and
simple. It leads to sensational cross-examination 'to affect credit,' which
have [sic] made the witness stand 'the slaughter house of reputations.' It
prevents the trial court from re-straining the bullying of witnesses and cre-
ates a general dislike, if not fear, of the witness function which impairs the
administration of justice.
Id.
76. See Irving R. Kaufman, The Philosophy of Effective Judicial Supervision
Over Litigation, 29 F.R.D. 207, 213 (1962) (quoting Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chief
Justice) quoted in WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETIAL DIscOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 22 (1968).
The fundamental premise of the federal rules is that a trial is an orderly
search for the truth in the interest of justice rather than a contest between
two legal gladiators with surprise and technicalities as their chief weapons.
29 F.R.D. at 213.
77. Edson R. Sunderland, FOREWORD To GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY
BEFORE TRtAL (Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1932), at iii.
78. Glaser, supra note 75, at 9.
79. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
214 [Vol. 21:203
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss1/4
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
Nevertheless, the modern discovery system does not totally
abandon the traditional orientation of the adversary system.
Currently, the parties' offering of evidence, motivated by self-
interest, is believed to be the most effective way to discover the
truth. Discovery is intended to strike a sound balance, retain-
ing the good and dispelling the evil.80 Under the modern discov-
ery scheme, the core device intended to accomplish this goal
was the work product doctrine.8' The work product doctrine
served to preserve the competitive relationship under the ad-
versary system by protecting each party's trial preparation and
mental processes from discovery.8 2 Consequently, the modem
adversary system is shaped by both discovery and the work
product doctrine.8 3 The interrelation between discovery and the
work product doctrine is the best indicia of how far discovery
deviates from the adversary system.
The argument that mandatory disclosure violates the ad-
versary system ignores the background and purpose of discov-
ery.8 4 The real questions are whether mandatory disclosure
pushes the discovery system further away from the adversary
system and, if so, whether this additional deviation is desirable.
A thorough examination of the adopted disclosure rules reveals
that mandatory disclosure barely diminishes the adversary
character of contemporary litigation beyond what discovery has
already done.
The best indicium of movement away from the adversary
system is the scope of the work product doctrine.8 5 Mandatory
disclosure does not reduce the scope of the work product doc-
trine.8 6 As Schwarzer pointed out, mandatory disclosure does
not dictate an obligation to disclose anything which would not
be already obtainable upon a simple request by the opposing
party.8 7 Mandatory disclosure only requires the disclosure of
80. See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Surveying Work Product, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 755 (1983).
81. See id. at 755.
82. See id. (explaining the basic concept of the work product doctrine).
83. See generally Clermont, supra note 80.
84. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
85. See generally Clermont, supra note 80.
86. See Schwarzer, supra note 37, at 722.
87. See id. at 721-22.
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certain 'core information.'88 Further, the scope of such informa-
tion is much narrower than what can be discovered under Rule
26(b).89
While it has been argued that automatic disclosure is fun-
damentally different from passively responding to a discovery
request, this argument loses sight of what has happened in past
discovery practice. 90 It is common discovery practice for a party
to serve an open-ended request, including the disclosure of the
identities of witnesses and production of all relevant docu-
ments. This practice is not prohibited by the rules and is con-
trolled only by Rule 26(b)(2) which is intended to prevent over-
reaching abuse.91 What has been criticized under mandatory
disclosure, i.e., that the attorney is required to use his profes-
sional judgment to determine what must be disclosed to benefit
the opposing party,92 so infringing on his mental privacy and
jeopardizing his functioning as his client's advocate, 93 has like-
wise happened under the discovery scheme. Given the fact that
the scope of mandatory disclosure is much more limited than
the scope of discovery, it would be more intrusive to ask an at-
torney to determine that which is discoverable upon receipt of a
discovery request. 94
Proponents of mandatory disclosure claim that such disclo-
sure was intended to further moderate the adversary process by
increasing the attorneys' obligations toward the court and by
eliminating the need for a discovery request and, more impor-
88. See id.
89. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
90. See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to
Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1 at n.159 (1992) quoting Comment from Section of Litiga-
tion, American Bar Association 6 (Feb. 7, 1992) ("[T]here is a major difference be-
tween a lawyer telling her client to look for specific documents covered by the
adverse party's document request or interrogatories, and telling the client to look
for documents 'that are likely to bear significantly on any claim or defense."').
91. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
92. See Bell et al., supra note 13, at 47-48. ("Critics have charged that, in es-
sence, the defendant will be required to assist in making the plaintiffs case for the
plaintiff. This result clearly would be contrary to the traditional notions of the
lawyer's role, as set out in Hickman v. Taylor."); 146 F.R.D. 402, 511 (Scalia J.,
dissenting) ("Requiring a lawyer to make a judgment as to what information is
'relevant to disputed facts' plainly requires him to use his professional skills in the
service of the adversary.") (citations omitted).
93. See Bell et al., supra note 13, at 47.
94. See id.
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tantly, the opportunity to dispute such a request. 95 However,
the adopted rules simply cannot fulfill this task. The attorney's
ethical obligations are simply not altered. 96 Under the adopted
rules, an attorney's obligation to the court is exactly the same
as his obligation under the original discovery rules.97 As to the
expectation of eliminating all disputes arising from discovery
requests by eliminating the need for such requests, the reality
seems to have gone the other way. Parties not only have not
stopped engaging in disputes arising from discovery but also
seem to have found new grounds to disagree-disputes over dis-
closure. 98 The intended picture of harmonious cooperation has
never appeared. 99 Automatic disclosure has not lessened the
adversary character to any perceivable degree. 100 In essence,
disclosure has done nothing more than add another tier to
discovery. l0
B. Overproduction of Information
The opponents of mandatory disclosure note another poten-
tial problem-that parties may overproduce information which is
not necessary in resolving the dispute. 0 2 Due to the vaguely
defined scope of disclosure under the rules, 0 3 parties may be
inclined to produce more information than required in order to
avoid the serious consequence of violating the disclosure obliga-
95. See Schwarzer, supra note 37, at 721-22.
96. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and 26(g).
97. See id.
98. See Bell et al., supra note 13, at 41-47.
99. See id. at 703-04.
100. See id. at 703.
101. See Bell et al., supra note 13, at 43 (alteration in original):
[The proponents of disclosure] envisioned a system in which unilateral
disclosure by the parties to their opponents would eliminate the familiar
caviling over whether particular documents were called for by a given re-
quest .... This predicted benefit of automatic disclosure is particularly
problematic because it will not replace the current discovery process ....
Rather, the new rule simply adds a new layer of disclosure, under a new
standard which will create its own procedural problems.
Id.
102. See Bell et al., supra note 13, at 43-44.
103. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
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tion.104 Thus, a direct result will be wasteful overproduction,
which has been an undesirable phenomenon under discovery
and could become worse under mandatory disclosure. 105
This criticism was met by the argument that mandatory
disclosure would not cause overproduction, but instead cure
it. 10 6 This theory proffered by mandatory disclosure proponents
was that the information required under mandatory disclosure
is merely a brief statement identifying witnesses with discover-
able information, describing the subject matter, and revealing
the location of relevant documents. 0 7 Since no detailed infor-
mation is required at this stage, 08 the parties would use the
disclosed information to identify useful information and conduct
efficient discovery. 0 9
In evaluating the effect of mandatory disclosure on overpro-
duction, two different situations must be considered. The first
situation is where the parties would have discovery regardless
of whether there is mandatory disclosure even without disclo-
sure. The second situation is where the parties would not need
any discovery in the first place. In the first situation, the over-
production question is not as serious as opponents of mandatory
disclosure contend. However, in the second situation where dis-
covery is not needed, mandatory disclosure would clearly pro-
104. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c). According to Rule 37(c), a party who fails to
disclose information required by Rule 26(a) will not be allowed to introduce such
information at trial. See id.
105. See Bell et al., supra note 13, at 43-44:
In the current discovery process, attorneys frequently both request and pro-
duce more documents than needed, primarily because of perceived ambigui-
ties in the scope of the requests. The vagueness in the scope of automatic
disclosure, combined with threat of sanctions under a revised Rule 26, will
create an even greater incentive for this practice.
Id.
106. See Schwarzer, supra note 37, at 721-22:
With regard to persons having discoverable information, it requires a
brief statement identifying them and the subjects of their information. With
respect to relevant documents, it requires a 'description by category and lo-
cation.' Armed with this information, the opponent should be able to re-
quest only what is considered relevant and useful, thus avoiding
overproduction and leading to more cost-effective discovery.
Id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
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duce unnecessary information. 110 Since many federal cases
commonly proceed without any discovery, a universal applica-
tion of mandatory disclosure would cause an overall inefficiency
on a system-wide scale."'
In the first situation involving a case that would entail dis-
covery, there is no evidence to support either the opponents' or
proponents' arguments that mandatory disclosure would cause
serious over-production or render discovery more effective. To
start, it is essential to recognize that not all relevant informa-
tion must be automatically disclosed." 2 The information must
be disclosed only when it is relevant to "disputed facts alleged
with particularity in the pleadings." 1 3 This "alleged with par-
ticularity" requirement was added to resolve the problem that
an open-ended disclosure obligation would impose unreasonably
heavy burdens on the defendant to produce piles of docu-
ments." 4 As pointed out by the advisory committee's notes,
vague allegations in the pleadings would not impose the obliga-
tion of disclosure on the other party. 1 5 Accordingly, this "al-
leged with particularity" requirement gives useful guidance to
the parties in deciding what information must be disclosed and,
therefore, dispels overproduction to some degree." 6
110. See Bell et al., supra note 13, at 5.
111. See Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on
Civil Discovery, 39 B.C.L. REV. 785, 790 (reciting the results of different empirical
studies and that 52% of the studied cases did not have formal discovery at all).
112. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
113. Id.
114. See Bell et al., supra note 13, at 24-32 for a detailed discussion. The 1991
proposed amendment required disclosure of any information that bears signifi-
cantly on any claim or defense. This amendment provoked strong opposition, espe-
cially from the parties likely to be in the position of defendant. It was contended
that such an open-ended disclosure obligation would leave an automobile manufac-
turer in a product liability suit at sea as to how many documents relating to the
design and manufacture process should be disclosed, and thereby put an extremely
heavy burden on the defendant. See id.
115. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a) advisory committee's note (1993):
Broad, vague, and conclusory allegations sometimes tolerated in notice
pleading-for example, the assertion that a product with many component
parts is defective in some unspecified manner-should not impose upon re-
sponding parties the obligation at that point to search for and identify all
persons possibly involved in, or all documents affecting, the design, manu-
facture, and assembly of the product.
Id.
116. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
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It is true that whether facts are "alleged with particularity"
in the pleadings is not free from dispute. Nevertheless, the pro-
cedural device of the "meet-and-confer" session under Rule 26(f)
can come into play to remedy this problem. The parties would
have opportunities to discuss what must be disclosed and to as-
certain the scope of the disclosure obligation during the "meet-
and-confer" session. This would also reduce the seriousness of
the overproduction problem. On those occasions where two par-
ties are not able to resolve their disagreement within the "meet-
and-confer" session, the parties might choose to fight over this
disagreement. This problem is discussed in the following sec-
tion on satellite litigation.
In sum, the "alleged with particularity" limitation com-
bined with the "meet-and-confer" process should eliminate the
concern about overproduction to a significant extent. This
would include situations where the parties cannot reach an
agreement and the party chooses to produce more information
instead of fighting over this issue.117 Given the fact that the
scope of discovery is much wider than that of disclosure, most, if
not all, of the overproduced information should still fall within
the scope of discovery. Consequently, the overproduction would
not be as serious a problem as asserted by the opponents of
mandatory disclosure."l 8
However, mandatory disclosure would not promote the effi-
ciency of discovery. Proponents of mandatory disclosure claim
the advantage is that parties can use the disclosed core infor-
mation to identify necessary witnesses and documents." 9 This
reasoning is flawed since a simple discovery request would al-
low the parties to acquire the same beneficial information. One
of the major problems in the discovery system, which
mandatory disclosure is intended to resolve, is the situation
where a party purposely abuses the discovery process in an at-
tempt to wear down the opposing counsel. 20 In this situation, it
is difficult to see how the party who intends to abuse the discov-
ery process would be prevented from doing so by receiving core
117. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
118. See Bell et al., supra note 13, at 43-44 for opponent's argument that over-
production is a serious problem.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 106-109.
120. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
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information in advance. In that situation, mandatory disclosure
does not promote efficiency, but offers another opportunity for
abuse. In short, the anticipated advantage of disclosure can be
obtained without mandatory disclosure. Furthermore,
mandatory disclosure cannot achieve the expected efficiency if
parties are not willing to cooperate.
In the second situation, where parties do not need discovery
at all, mandatory disclosure would force parties to produce un-
necessary information and, therefore, incur wasteful litigation
costs. The seriousness of this problem is magnified by the fact
that most federal cases did not involve any discovery at all
before the adoption of the mandatory disclosure rule.121 Conse-
quently, the universal application of mandatory disclosure to all
cases results in a significant, unnecessary resource consump-
tion. From this perspective, the undesirability of mandatory
disclosure is patent.
To be sure, disclosure costs on both parties may provide a
great incentive for them to reach an agreement, and this may
effectively mitigate the seriousness of systematic waste. 122
However, the problem with this resolution is that it would be
possible only when both parties bear comparable disclosure
costs. If both parties have significantly different disclosure
costs, the party with minimal, or even zero, disclosure costs
would have less incentive to reach such an agreement with the
other party. On the contrary, as a zealous litigant, he would
want to exploit this leverage to gain advantage over the oppos-
ing party by not sparing the other party the need of mandatory
disclosure. 123
121. See supra note 111.
122. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(f). Under FRCP 26(f), parties should meet at the
outset of litigation to arrange for the disclosure. See id. Suppose that each party
will have to spend $1500 on the disclosure of rule-required information (which is
unnecessary for both parties). In order to spare themselves the unnecessary ex-
penses, they have strong incentives to reach an agreement and relieve each other
from this cost. See id.
123. For example, the cost for the plaintiffto perform the disclosure obligation
is $500 while the cost for the defendant is $10,000. From the plaintiffs perspec-
tive, although he does not need the information at all, because the cost borne by
the defendant will give him an advantage on the negotiation table, he is not likely
to reach an agreement with the defendant and skip the mandatory disclosure
stage.
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Whether parties can reach a discovery agreement is a prag-
matic problem and cannot be conclusively answered without
resorting to an empirical study. Nevertheless, it can be as-
sumed that if the parties cannot agree to skip mandatory disclo-
sure in cases where no discovery is needed, the criticism that
mandatory disclosure causes systematic resource waste is
valid.124
C. Satellite Litigation
Another issue within the mandatory disclosure debates is
whether mandatory disclosure would produce additional satel-
lite litigation over disputes arising from the disclosure process
or whether it would reduce litigation ancillary to the entire dis-
covery process. The opponents of mandatory disclosure con-
tended that it could increase satellite litigation in many
ways. 125 The first would be to fight over all issues associated
with the mandatory disclosure, including whether a disputed
fact is "alleged with particularity." 126 Second, under the limited
time imposed by the rules, a defendant may be inclined to file a
motion to dismiss or a motion for a more definite statement in
an effort to 'buy some time. 127 Finally, in light of the great ad-
vantage created by the sanctions for failure to disclose,128 par-
ties have a strong motivation to move for sanctions under Rule
37.129
124. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
125. See discussion infra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
126. See 146 F.R.D. 402, 510 (Scalia J., dissenting) ("[Disclosure] will likely
increase the discovery burdens on district judges, as parties litigate about what is
'relevant' to 'disputed facts,' whether those facts have been alleged with sufficient
particularity, whether the opposing side has adequately disclosed the required in-
formation, and whether it has fulfilled its continuing obligation to supplement the
initial disclosure.") (emphasis added).
127. See Bell et al., supra note 13, at 43 ("As one Committee member warned,
'a lot of motion practice [will] be generated in bigger cases.' Faced with the daunt-
ing task of having to provide automatic disclosure under a notice pleading within
fifty-six to ninety-six days of filing an answer, many defendants may be forced to
file motions to dismiss or motions for a definite statement under Rule 12.") (cita-
tions omitted) (alteration in original).
128. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
129. See Bell et al., supra note 13, at 43 ("Finally, given the increasingly ad-
versarial nature of modern litigation, motion for sanction for non-compliance with
automatic disclosure will inevitably proliferate.").
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However, there are countervailing arguments. 130 The pro-
ponents of mandatory disclosure argue that it would generally
reduce disputes and motion practice during the discovery pro-
cess. 131 First, they argue that the "meet-and-confer" session
under Rule 26(f) will help parties reach agreement on details of
disclosure and discovery.132 In addition, a court order following
the "meet-and-confer" session would further prevent dis-
putes.' 33 Second, disclosure could reduce the amount of discov-
ery activities and at the same time decrease the disputes
associated with these activities. 34 Third, disclosure would clar-
ify what is actually relevant and what needs more development
through discovery so that it should discourage lawyers from us-
ing the uncertainties that surround many discovery requests as
invitations to obstruct, delay, avoid, and harass, thus spawning
endless disputes and motions.' 35
A careful analysis of the operation of mandatory disclosure
within the discovery system reveals that the arguments of both
the opponents and the proponents of mandatory disclosure are
unfounded. On the one hand, as to the disputes relating to
mandatory disclosure, the parties are unlikely to spar during
the disclosure stage. The reason for this is a practical one. It is
almost certain that the disputed information is discoverable
during the discovery stage whether or not the information is re-
lated to the facts pleaded "with particularity." 136 When there is
a dispute over whether the required information falls within the
scope of mandatory disclosure, the party who wants the infor-
mation can obtain it by a simple discovery request. 37 Ob-
taining information through discovery requests is surely more
efficient than motion practice.' 38 In addition, not only are there
130. See Schwarzer, supra note 37, at 722-23.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 723.
134. See id. at 723 (reducing the amount of discovery will create fewer oppor-
tunities for disputes that lead to motions).
135. See Schwarzer, supra note 37, at 722-23.
136. See supra note 126.
137. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
138. For the party who needs this disputed information, considering the fact
that sending a discovery request is much cheaper than fighting this question with
the other party through motion practice, a reasonable litigant is most likely to
choose the former course.
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litigation costs associated with a motion to compel, the parties
are required to confer in good faith, in an effort to secure disclo-
sure before making a motion. 139 There is no sufficient reason
for a party to file a motion to compel disclosure at that stage.
While it has been argued that the harsh sanctions for fail-
ure to disclose creates a great incentive to fight over disclo-
sure,140 this argument is overstated. The key to understanding
the actual effects of a court-ordered sanction is to realize that it
is not automatically imposed whenever one party fails to make
a mandatory disclosure. 141 The rule punishes only gross viola-
tions of disclosure obligations. 142 Considering that the disputed
information is normally discoverable at a later stage and that
consequences of a sanction are serious, it can reasonably be ex-
pected that parties are unlikely to baselessly refuse to dis-
close. 143 Thus, a court would not normally find that a party
failed to disclose without substantial justification, and sanc-
tions would, therefore, be granted sparingly. Consequently, the
slight chance of obtaining sanctions as well as the costs of mo-
tion practice would deter parties from making such motions.
On the other hand, it is not clear why mandatory disclosure
would reduce discovery disputes, as proponents contend.' 44 To
begin with, the proposition that mandatory disclosure could re-
duce discovery disputes by reducing the need for discovery is
doubtful. In light of the fact that the disclosed information is
only a summary description of certain discoverable evidence, it
is unlikely that the disclosed information would completely re-
duce the necessity of additional discovery. Moreover, most dis-
covery disputes involve the discoverability of the requested
information. 145 Before the parties make a motion to compel dis-
139. See FED. R. CIv. P. 37(a)(2)(a).
140. See, e.g., Bell supra note 13, at 13 (stating that attorneys may not have a
clear, financial incentive to use and overuse discovery in pursuit of a greater eco-
nomic award).
141. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
142. See id. An example of sanctionable conduct is the failure to disclose
without substantial justification. See id.
143. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 130-35.
145. With regard to the scope of discovery, FRCP 26(b)(1) only indicates the
outer limits of discoverable information. The real boundary of the scope of discov-
ery is shaped by the motions for protective orders under FRCP 26(c) and the mo-
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covery, they are obligated to try to resolve the disagreement. 46
If the dispute is such that the parties cannot resolve their disa-
greement by conferring with each other under FRCP 37 before
contesting the motion, it is difficult to see how mandatory dis-
closure or "meet-and-confer" provisions can enable the parties
to reach an agreement and eliminate the need of the satellite
litigation. 147
Consequently, an objective analysis leads to the conclusion
that mandatory disclosure would neither increase nor decrease
the satellite litigation associated with the discovery process.
On the one hand, the parties would tend to ignore the disagree-
ment during the disclosure stage and resolve it during discov-
ery.148 On the other hand, disputes that would have occurred
without mandatory disclosure would continue to arise even if
certain information has been disclosed through mandatory
disclosure. 149
It should be cautioned that the above analysis is conducted
in a purely theoretical framework and is by no means conclu-
sive. The most productive way to approach this issue is to re-
sort to empirical research to determine if mandatory disclosure
affects motion practice. Two empirical studies on mandatory
disclosure have addressed this issue and are discussed in Sec-
tion IV. 150
III. Law & Economics Analysis
As in many other fields, legal and economic analysis play
an important role in the disclosure debate. Because little data
exists to conclusively describe the actual effects of mandatory
disclosure, the important input from law and economics analy-
sis in this debate is its predictive ability rather than its explan-
atory power. However, the predictive ability of law and
tions for orders compelling discovery under FRCP 37(a). See FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2), 26(c), and 37(a).
146. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(a).
147. Logically speaking, if a dispute cannot be resolved by the parties' confer-
ring in good faith under FED. R. Civ. P. 37, it cannot be solved by their meeting and
conferring under FED. R. CIv. P. 26.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 136-143.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 144-147.
150. See discussion infra Part IV.
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economics analysis is not free from doubt. 15 1 To improve its pre-
dictive ability, it has been suggested that the economic analysis
should be based upon the available data about actual outcomes
or combined with empirical research. 152
Nevertheless, there are still inputs from pure law and eco-
nomic analysis that try to predict the effects of mandatory dis-
closure. 153 Before discussing the empirical results, it is worth
introducing the current economic analysis of mandatory disclo-
sure. Three aspects of mandatory disclosure have been studied
in the legal and economics analyses: settlement rates, litigation
costs, and strike suits. 5 4 The analyses suggest that, contrary to
the expectations of the drafters of the Rules, mandatory disclo-
sure would reduce settlement rates, increase the litigation
costs, and encourage strike suits. 55 Because litigation costs are
closely tied to settlement rates, these two aspects will be dis-
cussed together. 56
A. Reduced Settlement Rate and Increased Litigation Cost
Under the traditional economic analysis, cases would go to
trial only when the plaintiff and the defendant disagree on ei-
ther the probability of the plaintiffs success or the expected size
of judgment. 157 The disagreements were attributed to the par-
ties' lack of sufficient information about the factual or legal is-
sues in the case. 58 Accordingly, it has been suggested that full
disclosure of all relevant information would promote
settlement. '59
151. See generally Laurens Walker, Avoiding Surprise From Federal Civil
Rule Making: The Role of Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 569 (1994) (warn-
ing of the insufficiency of some forms of empirical studies to aid in rulemaking).
152. See id.
153. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New
Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61 (1995). See also Samuel Issacharoff & George
Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEx. L. REV.
753 (1995).
154. See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
155. See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
156. See infra Part III.A.
157. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Liti-
gation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 36-37 (1984).
158. See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 157.
159. See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 157.
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Utilizing this standard model to analyze the effects of
mandatory disclosure on settlement, it seems that mandatory
disclosure would only influence the timing of settlement rather
than the frequency of settlement. Since mandatory disclosure
was designed to facilitate the exchange of 'core information,' 160
and the reason for failing to settle is due to the parties' diver-
gent assessments of the case, early communication of informa-
tion should help facilitate a more accurate assessment of the
case and help the parties reach an agreement earlier. Taking
into account that the scope of disclosed information is much
narrower than the scope of discovery and that the information
disclosed under mandatory disclosure can be discovered during
the discovery process anyway, no additional information is pro-
duced under the disclosure scheme that would further the ex-
tent of the parties' agreement and, hence, increase the
likelihood of settlement. In sum, if there is any chance that the
exchange of information can lead to agreement, mandatory dis-
closure, at best, can accelerate its arrival but by no means can
increase its frequency. 161
It has been suggested that mandatory disclosure is likely to
reduce settlement rates and, therefore, increase litigation
costs. 162 Two arguments support this proposition. 163 The first is
that mandatory disclosure would compel both parties to disclose
adverse information which would enlarge the divergence of the
parties' expectations and, thereby, increase the difficulty in
reaching a settlement. 64 Upon learning information detrimen-
tal to the defendant, it is predictable that the plaintiff would
expect a greater judgment and would, therefore, demand a
larger settlement. Similarly, if the defendant knows of informa-
tion detrimental to the plaintiffs case, the defendant is likely to
160. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(1).
161. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 153, at 84. ("It is not clear to us,
however, that earlier provision of information will substantially reduce discovery
or trial costs; in fact, it is more likely to alter the timing, rather than the extent[,I
of settlements.").
162. See id. at 85 ("To the extent that settlement rates are affected, we believe
it is more likely that mandatory disclosure will lead to fewer settlements, with the
possibility of higher litigation costs."). See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & George
Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEx. L. REV.
753 (1995).
163. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 153, at 85.
164. See id.
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expect a smaller judgment and, therefore, offer less to settle. 165
As a result, the settlement zone becomes smaller and, accord-
ingly, the likelihood of reaching settlement decreases. Second,
mandatory disclosure would cause bifurcation of the discovery
period. 166 Once the parties have borne the front-loading costs
accrued in the disclosure stage, they would have fewer disincen-
tives to proceed further. This would also reduce the settlement
rate. 167
In anticipation of this decreased settlement rate, critics ar-
gued that mandatory disclosure would increase litigation
costs 168 because less settlement means more trials, hence more
costs. While automatic disclosure would spare both parties the
expenses of demanding discovery, this saving may not be classi-
fied as significant "because the cost of mechanical filing of rou-
tine early discovery is not substantial. " 169  The analysis
concluded that litigation costs could be saved in the disclosure
scheme under only one condition-where parties have widely di-
vergent assessments on the case, and this divergence can be
eliminated considerably by the disclosed information, which
was deemed to be an unlikely occurrence. 170
A reexamination of the reasons for reducing settlement
rates reveals that the adverse effects of mandatory disclosure
on settlement are somewhat exaggerated. 171 For instance, if
mandatory disclosure forced parties to disclose harmful infor-
mation which would affect both settlement offers and demands,
these adverse effects are mutual and would affect both parties.
There is no reason to believe that, when the plaintiff discloses
detrimental information to the defendant, the only effect will be
to make the defendant reduce her settlement offer, and plaintiff
165. See id.
166. See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 162, at 761.
167. See id. at 761-68. See also Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 161, at 87
(arguing that mandatory disclosure would shift the information cost from the trial
to the pretrial stage, and that the parties' incentives to settle would decrease as
the trial costs diminish).
168. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 153, at 85.
169. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 162, at 786.
170. See id. at 776 ("[Tlhe only condition under which mandatory disclosure
can be expected to reduce litigation costs significantly is one in which there is a
great deal of systematic bias and in which the disclosed information leads to a
considerable convergence in the positions of the parties.").
171. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 162, at 759-62.
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will not take this into consideration. On the contrary, the plain-
tiff is likely to take this into account and adjust his own settle-
ment demand accordingly. The same is true for the defendant.
When both parties inject their respective advantages and disad-
vantages into their settlement calculation, the settlement zone
would not necessarily become significantly smaller.
Furthermore, while the front-loading costs would decrease
the parties' incentives to settle, this is only true during the pe-
riod between disclosure and discovery. On the one hand, if the
parties would have discovered the disclosed information even
without mandatory disclosure, the same costs would still be
borne by the parties. No additional costs would be incurred
which would decrease the incentive to settle. In the situation
where the case could have been settled without any discovery,
the costs associated with the wasteful and unnecessary disclo-
sure might actually promote settlement. Because both parties
could have settled without any exchange of information, the
costs associated with mandatory disclosure would strengthen
the parties' incentives to settle prior to the mandatory disclo-
sure stage. From this perspective, mandatory disclosure would
promote settlement. 172
Viewed objectively, the competing arguments are equal in
force. As recognized by the law and economics analysis, the
best way to untie these tangled arguments, may be to resort to
empirical research to reveal what happens in the real world. 173
B. Proliferation of Strike Suits
Opponents of mandatory disclosure have argued that such
disclosure would cause the proliferation of strike suits. 174
Strike suits, for present purposes, are suits with no merits or
172. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 153, at 87 (acknowledging the possi-
bility that mandatory disclosure would increase the probability of settlement. "For
example, mandatory disclosure may be less susceptible to strategic manipulation,
because discovery rules determine what is disclosed. Avoidance of strategic ma-
nipulation may itself tend to avoid divergent expectations, and therefore increase
the probability of settlement.").
173. See id. ("Only empirical research can determine whether the primary in-
centive effects will dominate as we predict, or whether secondary effects will prove
more powerful.").
174. See, e.g., Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 153, at 88. See also Issacharoff
& Loewenstein, supra note 162, at 786.
2000] 229
27
PACE LAW REVIEW
with an extremely low probability of success that are initiated
by the plaintiff in the hopes of obtaining a nuisance settlement.
Starting with the proposition that the defendant normally bears
more disclosure costs than the plaintiff, the argument is that
the asymmetrical distribution of disclosure costs would greatly
encourage the plaintiff to initiate a strike suit and use it as lev-
erage to solicit an unjust settlement. 175 The most important
premise of this argument is that the defendant incurs more dis-
closure costs than the plaintiff.176 However, it is unclear where
this proposition originated. This may be true where a citizen
sues a big corporation, but it would be improper to generalize
this to all civil cases.177
Furthermore, even assuming that the defendant generally
does bear more disclosure costs than the plaintiff, the predicted
proliferation of strike suits is doubtful. The key is to realize that
the scope of mandatory disclosure is not broader than the scope
of the discovery rules. 78 If there indeed exists an asymmetrical
distribution of costs in disclosure, the same would also be true
in discovery. Considering that the cost of making a discovery
request normally is small, if the plaintiff is able to initiate a
strike suit in the disclosure scheme, he would also be able to use
this asymmetrical distribution as leverage to obtain a settle-
ment in the discovery process. There seems to be no reason to
believe that mandatory disclosure would produce more strike
suits than discovery without disclosure would have. The point
is that when considering the effects of mandatory disclosure on
strike suits, it is essential to take the whole discovery process
175. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 153, at 88. "Mandatory disclosure
typically imposes greater demands on the parties to reveal information early in the
litigation process. To the extent that the majority of disclosure is made by defend-
ants at their own expense, and to the extent that the disclosure involves more than
bare-bones responses (e.g., detailed information about the expert's opinions), the
plaintiff faces a reduced cost of proceeding with a suit sufficiently far to obtain an
accurate assessment of the suit's prospects." Id. See also Issacharoff & Loewen-
stein, supra note 162, at 769 ("By imposing costs almost exclusively on the defen-
dant and by providing sanctions for a lackluster provision of information, the new
statute greatly increases the attractiveness of strike suits.").
176. See supra note 175.
177. For instance, in a situation where a doctor sues his patient for unpaid
fees and the defendant raises an affirmative defense in the pleading (such as the
plaintiff mistreated him and committed malpractice) it can be expected that the
plaintiff will face heavier burdens than the defendant will.
178. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
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into consideration. Accordingly, the argument that mandatory
disclosure would encourage strike suits would be valid only if
mandatory disclosure would systematically impose more addi-
tional costs on the defendant than on the plaintiff.
Even assuming that such an asymmetrical distribution of
additional disclosure costs exists, strike suits will increase only
if the asymmetrical distribution of additional discovery costs is
substantial enough to allow the plaintiff to solicit a nuisance
settlement. Taking into account that the extent and content of
information required to be disclosed is essentially limited and
most costs would have been incurred during discovery even
without mandatory disclosure, any additional costs are not
likely to be substantial enough to produce strike suits.
IV. Two Empirical Studies of Mandatory Disclosure
While many empirical studies have been conducted on the
topic of discovery, because of the relatively short history of the
mandatory disclosure rule, only two studies have addressed the
issue of mandatory disclosure. 179 The Rand report, the first of
these studies, was based upon the data from Rand's previous
studies on the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990.180 The
CJRA research mainly focused on the comparison between ten
"pilot" district courts and ten "comparison" district courts to see
the effect of different techniques of case management mandated
by the CJRA.' 8' Mandatory early disclosure was one of the case
management techniques implemented in some districts. 8 2 At
the behest of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Rand
Institute conducted a further analysis of the effect of the differ-
ent mandatory disclosure techniques and produced the Rand
report.83
The second study, the FJC report, was based on empirical
research conducted by the Federal Judicial Center. 8 4 The pur-
179. See RAND REPORT I, supra note 28. See also FJC REPORT, supra note 29.
180. See generally RAND REPORT I, supra note 28.
181. For an introduction of the CJRA and the experiment implemented pursu-
ant to this Act, see generally JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CIML JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS (1996) [hereinaf-
ter RAND REPORT II].
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See generally FJC REPORT, supra note 29.
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pose of this research was to assess the effect of the 1993 amend-
ment to the discovery rules, including mandatory disclosure.18 5
This research was also initiated at the request of the Advisory
Committee, and its findings carried great weight in the Advi-
sory Committee's proposed further amendment to the disclosure
rule. 8 6 After general observations of the two reports' respective
research methodologies and major findings, this Article will
comment on the validity of the two studies and their reliability
as a basis for further amendment of the mandatory disclosure
rule.
A. Rand Report
1. Methodology
The basic methodology of this report was to compare four
different aspects of cases filed within twenty district courts, ten
"pilot" district courts and ten "comparison" district courts that
adopted different rules or policies on mandatory disclosure. 8 7
The cases, filed in 1992-1993, were used to compare hours of
lawyer work, time to disposition, attorney satisfaction, and at-
torney views on fairness. While only subjective opinions gath-
ered from attorneys were used to evaluate attorney satisfaction
and attorney views on fairness, the other two aspects did rest on
objective criteria such as the attorney's actual working hours
and the actual time which elapsed before case disposition.
Lawyer work was intended to be an index of litigation cost
and purported to be "the best available measure of how case
management affects litigation costs." 8 8 The study observed
both the number of work hours on the entire case and the num-
ber of work hours spent on discovery.' 8 9 However, the number
of work hours spent on the entire case, as opposed to the num-
ber of hours spent on discovery, was considered to be a more
accurate measure to test the influence of mandatory disclosure
on litigation costs. 90 The time to disposition was used to assess
whether mandatory disclosure would facilitate or delay the res-
185. See id.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
187. See RAND REPORT I, supra note 28, at xvi-xviii.
188. Id. at xvii.
189. See id.
190. See id. at xvii-xviii.
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olution of cases. 191 These two research observations, as mea-
sured by the objective criteria, should be reliable indicia of the
effect of mandatory disclosure on litigation cost and time.
However, it is important to note that although the selected
district courts had adopted some type of mandatory disclosure
rule, none was identical to the disclosure requirements adopted
by the 1993 FRCP amendment. 192 Therefore, while this report
is able to appraise the mandatory disclosure policy in a general
scope, as cautioned in the report itself, the data should not be
used to evaluate the current mandatory disclosure rule adopted
in the 1993 amendment. 193
2. Major Findings
Before evaluating the four features of the comparison, the
Rand report addressed the question of satellite litigation. 194
Aimed at testing the criticism that mandatory disclosure would
increase satellite litigation and motion practice, the Rand re-
port found that it was extremely rare for one party to file a com-
pliance motion when the opposing party arguably violated her
disclosure obligation.195 It also found no evidence that any sub-
stantial increase of satellite litigation and motion practice oc-
curred in those district courts adopting some type of mandatory
disclosure. 196
With regard to lawyer work hours, the report found gener-
ally no significant statistical difference between cases with
early disclosure activities and cases without. 97 The same was
true when the comparison was drawn between cases from dis-
trict courts with a mandatory disclosure policy and cases from
district courts without such a policy, irrespective of whether
any mandatory disclosure did occur in a particular case. 198 Both
findings remain valid whether the measure was the total work
hours or the work hours on discovery. 99 Similarly, these obser-
191. See id.
192. See RAND REPORT I, supra note 28, at 17.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 48.
197. See RAND REPORT I, supra note 28, at 48.
198. See id.
199. See id.
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vations survive when most different subsets of cases, such as
stakes in dispute, complexity of the case, or difficulty of discov-
ery, were tested. 200
While two sets of cases were found to have fewer lawyer
work hours, the report concluded that this did not present suffi-
cient evidence to suggest that mandatory disclosure reduces the
attorney work hours.20 1 The first set of cases reviewed was filed
in the district courts with rules for "early mandatory disclosure
of information bearing on both sides of the dispute. ''20 2 Since
this finding was based upon only three observed district courts,
the report expressed doubt on generalizing from this result.20 3
The second set of cases was filed in district courts having a vol-
untary disclosure policy.20 4 The report theorized that the de-
crease in lawyer work hours in these cases was due to the
nature of the case rather than because of disclosure.20 5
Regarding time to disposition, the report again found that
there was no statistically significant difference between those
cases filed in the district courts with a voluntary mandatory
disclosure policy and those cases filed in the district courts
without such a policy.20 6 This result also held when the compar-
ison was made between cases that had disclosure activities and
cases that did not.20 7 In testing different subtypes of cases in
terms of stakes, complexity, or discovery difficulty, the report
reached the same conclusion. 208
The report addressed two contrasting findings in reference
to attorney satisfaction. 20 9 In district courts which imposed a
mandatory disclosure policy, attorney satisfaction was signifi-
cantly lower.210 Attorney satisfaction was higher in the district
courts which implemented a voluntary disclosure policy and the
200. See id. at 48-49.
201. See id.
202. RAND REPORT I, supra note 28, at 49.
203. See id. at 49.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 50. The report theorized that the cases were less contentious
and, therefore, fewer work hours were needed. See id.
206. See id. at 50-51.
207. See RAND REPORT I, supra note 28, at 51.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 51.
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attorneys chose to make such a disclosure. 211 However, the re-
port cautioned that this analysis might be the result of "selec-
tion bias."212
With respect to attorney views on fairness, no significant
statistical difference was found in any set of comparisons.
213
B. FJC Report
1. Methodology
The FJC report was based upon 1,178 responses to ques-
tionnaires distributed to 2,000 attorneys involved in 1,000
cases. 21 4 The 1,000 cases were a sample of all general civil cases
that were likely to have some discovery activities, 215 and all of
which were terminated in 86 district courts during 1996.216 The
response rates from the district courts adopting the mandatory
disclosure rules, from the district courts "opting-out" of the
mandatory disclosure rules, and from the district courts with
mixed rules were almost identical.21 7
The most significant feature of this report is that the find-
ings were squarely based on both the attorneys' subjective im-
pressions about the particular case and upon their general
opinions, rather than upon purely objective criteria. 218 Al-
though twelve topics concerning discovery were covered in the
questionnaire, three topics are particularly relevant to the
mandatory disclosure issue: (1) the frequency, the effects, and
the problems of initial disclosure, (2) the frequency, the effects,
and the problems of expert disclosure, and (3) the frequency and
211. See id. at 52.
212. See RAND REPORT I, supra note 28, at 52. ("[A]ttorneys on cases for
which they voluntarily choose to disclose may be less contentious attorneys or may
be on less contentious cases and hence more satisfied, but not necessarily because
of the early disclosure.").
213. See id.
214. See FJC REPORT, supra note 29, at 57-79.
215. See id. at 57. The pool of cases from which the chosen cases were sampled
excluded some types of cases that normally would not have any discovery activi-
ties, such as loan collection, prisoner, land condemnation, foreclosure, bankruptcy,
drug-related property, forfeiture, social security, and asbestos product liability
cases. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 58.
218. See id.
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the effects of the "meet-and-confer" requirement. 219 Since this
Article does not discuss the issue of expert disclosure, only the
first and third questions will be considered.
In investigating the effects of initial disclosure and the
"meet-and-confer" requirement, the questionnaire focused on
the following: overall litigation costs, time from filing to disposi-
tion, overall procedural fairness, and fairness of case out-
come.220 In addition, three other aspects were investigated
concerning the effect of initial disclosure: prospects of settle-
ment, the amount of discovery, and the number of discovery dis-
putes.221 With regard to the effect of the "meet-and-confer"
requirement, its influence on a number of issues was also inves-
tigated. 222 These questions were comprehensive enough to
cover most of the concerns pertaining to the impact of initial
disclosure and the "meet-and-confer" requirement. However,
the questionnaire provided only four responses for answering
each question: "increased," "had no effect," "decreased," or "I
can't say."223 The results were shown in a table of simple cross-
tabulation of different responses. 224 The report categorized the
responses according to different types of cases, the stakes in dis-
pute, and the complexity of those cases. 225
The Federal Judicial Center conducted further empirical
research, using regression and survival analysis, to examine
the relationship among different variables of interest. 226 The
district courts' policy of initial disclosure was included as one of
the explanatory variables tested against two dependent vari-
ables: total litigation costs and disposition time.227 The report
further stated that the information regarding the total litiga-
tion cost came from the attorneys' estimates and the informa-
tion pertaining to the disposition time that was obtained from
docket data.228
219. See FJC REPORT, supra note 29, at 5-7.
220. See id. at 62, 64.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 62.
223. See id. at 62, 64.
224. See FJC REPORT, supra note 29, at 26.
225. See id. at 16-17.
226. See id. at 52.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 52-53.
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2. Major Findings
The report concluded that "[i]nitial disclosure is being
widely used and is apparently working as intended, increasing
fairness and reducing costs and delays far more than decreasing
fairness or increasing costs and delays. Attorneys reported that
initial disclosure reduced litigation cost and time."229 However,
a careful reading of the specific figures shown in the cross-tabu-
lation table of the report reveals that this conclusion is some-
what overstated. 230 A more accurate description of the research
findings is that most attorneys did not think that initial disclo-
sure had any effects. 231 However, among those attorneys who
thought initial disclosure had some effects, more believed that
they were positive. 232 The same is also true for the effects of the
"meet-and-confer" requirement.233
With regard to the frequency of initial disclosure, among
the 886 attorneys who reported that any disclosure or discovery
was involved in their cases, 58% said that initial disclosure was
used in their cases. 234 A more important finding was that
among those cases involving initial disclosure, other discovery
activities also took place in 89% of these cases. 235 As concluded
in the report, this finding indicated that "disclosure infre-
quently replaces discovery entirely."236
Regarding the effects of initial disclosure, a majority of re-
spondents believed that initial disclosure had no effect on time
from filing to disposition (62%), overall procedural fairness
(54%), fairness of case outcome (70%), prospect of settlement
(59%), and number of discovery disputes (62%).237 Similarly, a
plurality of responses indicated that initial disclosure had no
effect on overall litigation expenses (45%) or the amount of dis-
covery (47%).238 Among those reporting that there were some
effects, the positive effects consistently outweighed the negative
229. FJC REPORT, supra note 29, at 2.
230. See id. at 26.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 32.
234. See FJC REPORT, supra note 29, at 23.
235. See id.
236. Id. at 23.
237. See id. at 26.
238. See id.
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effects. 239 In specific types of cases, the research found that the
reported positive effects of initial disclosure are systematically
lower in high-stake, high-complexity cases than in ordinary
cases.
240
Dealing with the problems of initial disclosure, the report
found that the most common problem was that disclosure was
too brief or incomplete. 241 In contrast to this finding, a more
striking discovery was that satellite litigation was rarely ever
reported, and only 6% cited the problem that disclosure oc-
curred only after a motion or a court order.242 As to specific
types of cases, the report again found that problems of initial
disclosure were more likely to be reported in high-stake, high-
complexity litigation.243
A majority of responding attorneys believed that the "meet-
and-confer" requirement had no effect on overall litigation ex-
penses (54%), time from filing to disposition (62%), overall pro-
cedural fairness (61%), fairness of case outcome (73%), and
number of issues (70%).244 A majority of those reporting an ef-
fect stated that the positive effects were greater.245
All of the above findings were based upon the interviewed
attorneys' impressions about the sampled cases in which they
were involved. 246 When questioned about their general opinions
on the discovery system, 44% of the 1,036 responding attorneys
thought that adopting a uniform, nationwide rule requiring ini-
tial disclosure would reduce litigation costs without interfering
239. See FJC REPORT, supra note 29, at 26. The percentage of "increased"
versus the percentage of "decreased" on every individual aspect was as follows:
overall litigation expense (16% v. 39%), time from filing to disposition (7% v. 32%),
overall procedural fairness (37% v. 9%), fairness of case outcome (25% v. 5%), pros-
pects of settlement (36% v. 6%), amount of discovery (10% v. 43%), and number of
discovery disputes (5% v. 33%). See id.
240. See id. at 26-27.
241. See id. at 27 (19% out of 517 respondents).
242. See id.
243. See id. at 28.
244. See FJC REPORT, supra note 29, at 32.
245. See id. at 32. The percentage of "increased" versus the percentage of"de-
creased" on different individual questions was as follows: overall litigation expense
(17% v. 29%), time from filing to disposition (9% v. 29%), overall procedural fair-
ness (33% v. 7%), fairness of case outcome (21% v. 5%), and number of issues (6% v.
24%). See id.
246. See id. at 32.
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with fair case resolution. 247 On the contrary, 31% believed that
totally deleting the initial disclosure rule would achieve the
same goal. 248
In this later analysis, it was found that initial disclosure
does not correlate with the total litigation costs. 249 However, it
was observed that time to disposition was shorter in the cases
with initial disclosure. 250
C. Evaluation of the Two Reports
These two reports can be compared and assessed regarding
methodology, findings, and reliability as a basis for reforming
mandatory disclosure. In terms of methodology, the criteria
used in the Rand report were more objective than that used in
the FJC report. In reference to findings, these two reports
seemingly told the same story: the criticism that mandatory dis-
closure would promote satellite litigation was unfounded, and
mandatory disclosure did not achieve the intended effects of
saving litigation costs or facilitating case disposition. In regard
to reliability, both reports had some deficiencies in accessing
the effects of the mandatory disclosure rule.
With over 5,000 cases observed, 251 the Rand report promi-
nently adopted two objective criteria: (1) the attorney work
hour as an index of the litigation costs, and (2) the actual docket
data on time to disposition. 252 Both of these questions undoubt-
edly posed the greatest concern and provided the best indicia of
the effects of the mandatory disclosure rule.25 3 Consequently,
the conclusion reached in the Rand report should be highly reli-
able. However, the cases studied were filed before the 1993
amendment came into effect, and none of the studied district
courts adopted the same mandatory disclosure rule now imple-
mented in Rule 26(a)(1). 254 This limitation makes it doubtful
whether the result of this report could be used to assess the ef-
247. See id.
248. See id. at 44.
249. See FJC REPORT, supra note 29, at 44.
250. See id. at 54-55.
251. See RAND REPORT I, supra note 28, at xviii.
252. See id.
253. Reducing costs and facilitating early disposition are two major goals of
mandatory disclosure. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
254. See RAND REPORT I, supra note 28, at 17.
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fectiveness of the mandatory disclosure rules adopted by the
1993 amendment. As the report itself repeatedly cautioned, "we
could not use our data to evaluate that revised rule"255 and "the
'empirical' story of the effect of Rule 26(a)(1) remains to be
told."256
The FJC report was based mainly on cases filed after the
1993 amendment 257 and, therefore, its data should be more reli-
able for evaluating the effects of mandatory disclosure. How-
ever, because there existed a selection bias in the data, some
adverse effects might not be reflected in the report. 258 For ex-
ample, cases that could have been disposed of without any dis-
closure or discovery were not considered. 259 This omission
cannot be ignored because mandatory disclosure is most likely
to have adverse effects on these cases. Disclosure, according to
Rule 26(a)(1), is mandated in all cases without regard to
whether any discovery is necessary in the specific case.260 It is
probable that most cases outside the study's coverage could
have been disposed of without any discovery activity, but the
parties were still forced to make initial disclosure. The attor-
neys for these cases would obviously report negative effects of
mandatory disclosure, but they were systematically excluded
from this research.
With regard to its methodology, the FJC report's finding
was, for the most part, based on the responding attorney's opin-
ion about the particular case.261 Compared with the empirical
study based upon the docket data, this methodology has both
advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that the at-
torney could report some aspects of the case that are not shown
in the docket data.262 On the other hand, there is a danger that
the attorney's personal opinions and perceptions about
mandatory disclosure may have affected his answer. For exam-
255. See id.
256. Id. at 49.
257. See id. at 57-59.
258. See supra Part V. A.2. for a discussion on systematic bias.
259. See supra Part V. A.2.
260. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
261. See FJC REPORT, supra note 29, at 58.
262. Certain aspects of the case cannot be proved by the docket data. Exam-
ples of the aspects that the attorneys can report are the actual litigation costs and
their impression of overall fairness during the whole process.
240 [Vol. 21:203
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss1/4
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
ple, in the FJC report, the questionnaire posed the question
"What effects did initial disclosure have on the named
case[?]"263 In answering, the interviewed attorney was given
the four options of "increased," "had no effect," "decreased," and
"I can't say."264 It was unclear what basis for comparison was to
be used, and the report did not provide any guidance in this
regard. Did the "effect" mean that it was to be compared with
other cases the attorney handled? Was it to be compared with
the anticipated course of the named case without initial disclo-
sure? Was it to be compared by some other standard? Without
some clear comparison basis and an objective criterion, the an-
swer could be meaningless.
Perhaps perceiving this danger, the FJC report subse-
quently added a further analysis to test the effect of mandatory
disclosure on litigation costs and time to disposition. 265 This
analysis contradicted the report's previously overstated conclu-
sion and showed that there is no correlation between
mandatory disclosure and litigation costs. 266 The report based
its analysis on the docket data and indicated that initial disclo-
sure reduced the time to disposition. 267 This analysis of the ef-
fect of time to disposition is different from the empirical study
conducted in this Article. Because the FJC report did not ex-
plain the details of its analysis, this Article cannot explore the
reason for the difference.
Despite the respective limitations of the two reports, they
seemingly reached the same findings on the effects of
mandatory disclosure. Their consistent findings rebut both the
opponents' and proponents' arguments. The reports illustrate
that the opponents' argument suggesting that mandatory dis-
closure may increase satellite litigation is unfounded. 268 On the
other hand, their findings also contradict the proponents' con-
tention that mandatory disclosure may decrease litigation costs
and facilitate the disposition of cases.
263. FJC REPORT, supra note 29, at 64.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 52.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See discussion supra Part IV.
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In an effort to supplement these two empirical studies, this
Article reports independent empirical research to test the ef-
fects of the mandatory disclosure rule.
V. New Empirical Research-A Comparison Between
Different Districts
A. Methodology
Compared with distributing questionnaires to practicing
attorneys and collecting their opinions, a more convenient and
more important objective method is to analyze the docket data
of actual cases handled under different disclosure rules. This
Article examines two questions in evaluating the effects of the
mandatory disclosure rule: (1) whether mandatory disclosure
reduces time to case disposition, and (2) whether mandatory
disclosure affects the trial rate.
The importance of these two questions for evaluating the
effectiveness of mandatory disclosure is apparent. Since facili-
tating early resolution of disputes is an important purpose of
mandatory disclosure, comparison of time to case disposition in
different district courts which have adopted different rules is a
sound indicator of whether the mandatory disclosure rule
drives the system in the desired direction. Studying the trial
rate tests whether the mandatory disclosure rule, as asserted
by some law and economics analysis, reduces the settlement
rate. Finally, the two questions relate to the overall concern of
litigation costs. Both time to case disposition and the method
for case disposition are often indicia of litigation costs. The
more time needed for case disposition, the more litigation costs
mount for both the litigants, in particular, and the system in
general. Consequently, cases disposed of by trial normally in-
cur more expenses than those disposed of without trial. There-
fore, an increasing trial rate systematically indicates that
higher expenses are borne by the litigants and the judicial
system.
In analyzing time to case disposition and trial rate, two
models are used: a vertical comparison model and a horizontal
comparison model. 269 In the vertical model, a comparison is
269. See infra Table 1.
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made among the district courts adopting the mandatory disclo-
sure rule within the period "before opting-in" and "after opting-
in" to the rule.27 0 This vertical model purports to observe (1)
whether cases were resolved faster after the district courts
adopted the mandatory disclosure rules, and (2) whether cases
going to trial decreased. Since the Rand and FJC studies were
limited to single time periods, they could not conduct a vertical
analysis. In other words, all of their results could be attributed
to inter-district differences and not the effect of the mandatory
disclosure rules.
The horizontal model illustrates differences between the
district courts that adopted mandatory disclosure and the dis-
trict courts that "opted-out" of the rule.271 Additionally, district
courts that "opted-out" of the mandatory disclosure rule but
adopted the "meet-and-confer" requirement are distin-
guished.272 Consequently, in the horizontal model, the district
courts that adopted the rule are compared with both the district
courts that "opted-out" and the district courts that adopted only
the "meet-and-confer" rule.273
However, the horizontal comparison of district courts may
be misleading since there could have been significant differ-
ences among the three different types of district courts before
the mandatory disclosure rule came into play. These differ-
ences might stem from factors other than the district courts' dif-
ferent disclosure rules. For example, the data might show that
cases in the district courts adopting the mandatory disclosure
rule were resolved in an average of 20 days faster than cases in
the district courts "opting-out" of the rule. However, before the
courts adopted the mandatory disclosure rule, cases were re-
solved on an average of 30 days faster than cases in the district
courts which eventually "opted-out" of the mandatory disclosure
rule. Thus, it may be that case disposition became relatively
slower because the courts adopted the mandatory disclosure
rule. Without taking this factor into consideration, it is easy to
mistakenly attribute any distinctions among the three types of
district courts to their different disclosure rules. In order to
270. See infra Table 1.
271. See infra Table 1.
272. See infra Table 1.
273. See infra Table 1.
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eliminate this problem, it is essential to include a parallel
model of horizontal comparison among these three types of dis-
trict courts (before the mandatory disclosure rule was adopted)
to determine if any differences had, in fact, existed beforehand.
Accordingly, six types of district courts are studied, as shown in
Table 1.274
1. The Data
The primary data used for this empirical research came
from the computerized data gathered by the Administrative Of-
fice of the United States Courts.27 5 The data was then assem-
bled by the Federal Judicial Center and disseminated by the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Re-
search.276 It enables the study of the outcomes of all cases ter-
minated in Federal Court.27 7 When a case terminates in
Federal District Court, the clerk transmits to the Administra-
tive Office a form containing information about the case.2 78
This transmission includes important information about all
cases filed in the federal courts including when and where the
case was filed, when and how the case was disposed of, how
274. The data reports which district courts adopted the mandatory disclosure
rules, which district courts "opted-out," which district courts adopted only the
"meet-and-confer" rule, and when they adopted their respective rules. This data
comes from the reports of the Federal Judicial Center. See DONNA STIENSTRA, IM-
PLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, WITH SPECIFIC
ATTENTION To COURTS' RESPONSES To SELECTED AMENDMENTS To FEDERAL RULE
OF CML PROCEDURE 26 (Fed. J. Ctr. 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998). The "opt-in"
district courts in Table 1 adopted the mandatory disclosure rule either by local
rules or by general orders. The "opt-out" district courts not only did not adopt the
mandatory disclosure rule, but also did not authorize the judges to order disclosure
in specific cases. The "mixed" district courts neither adopted mandatory disclo-
sure nor authorized judges to order disclosure, but instead adopted the "meet-and-
confer" requirement in 26(f). See id.
275. See 11 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Guide to Judiciary Poli-
cies and Procedures transmittal 64, at 11-18 to -28 (Mar. 1, 1985). For a complete
description of Administrative Office data, see Inter-University Consortium for Po-
litical and Social Research, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 1970-
1987, ICPSR 8429 (2d ed. Winter 1989 & Supps. 1990, 1992, &1995). For easy
access to this database, see Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Judicial
Statistical Inquiry Form available at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/ques-
tata.htm (last updated Nov. 15, 1998) which is discussed in Theodore Eisenberg &
Kevin M. Clermont, Courts in Cyberspace, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 94 (1996).
276. See supra note 275.
277. See supra note 275.
278. See supra note 275.
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Table 1: Comparison Model
Horizontal District courts opting District courts opting District courts opting
Comparison - in mandatory out of mandatory in "meet-and-confer"
disclosure rule disclosure rule rule only
(post-opt-in district (post-opt-out (post-mixed district
courts)* district courts)** courts)***
Parallel District courts before District courts before District courts before
horizontal opting in mandatory opting out of opting in "meet-and-
comparison -* disclosure rule mandatory disclosure confer" rule only
rule
(pre-opt-in district (pre-opt-out district (pre-mixed district
courts)**** courts) courts)
vertical comparison
* 21 district courts were "post-opt-in" district courts: Delaware (1/1/1995), New Jersey (1/13/
1994), Mississippi (N) (10/1/1993), Mississippi (S) (10/1/1993), Texas (S) (12/1/1993), Kentucky
(E) (1/9/1995), Kentucky (W) (2/1/1994), Tennessee (E) (3/111994), Tennessee (W) (2/1/1994),
Wisconsin (W) (12/6/1993), Missouri (W) (12/6/1993), Nebraska (12/30/1993), North Dakota (1/
23/1995), South Dakota (12/30/1993), Montana (1/25/1994), Washington (E) (10/12/1994),
Colorado (4/15/1994), Kansas (1128/1994), New Mexico (2/1/1994) and Alabama (S) (3/2/1994).
The date within ( ) indicates when the district adopted the mandatory disclosure rule.
** 5 district courts were "post-opt-out" district courts: New Hampshire (12/6/1993-12/31
1995), Puerto Rico (5/9/1994), Rhode Island (6/16/1994), W. Virginia (N) (2/5/1994-3/1/1996)
and Wisconsin (E) (1/7/1994).
*** 5 district courts were "post-mixed" district courts: New York (N) (12/14/1993), Vermont (1/
3/1994), Iowa (N) (7/1/1994), Iowa (S) (7/1/1994) and Hawaii (2/15/1995).
**** The three "pre" types of district courts are the "post" district courts before they adopted
their stance on mandatory disclosure. The cases filed in these "pre" district courts include
cases filed after 1/111990, but before the adopting date which varies among the district courts.
many days were taken to dispose of the case, and what type of
case was involved.279 It is this information which was used in
the following research and analyzed through certain statistical
techniques.
This data was further adjusted in several ways. First, judi-
cial caseload was included in the analysis. Since caseload obvi-
ously affects how fast a case proceeds in court, it is essential to
account for this variable. Second, civil cases related to prison-
ers were excluded since these cases are significantly different
from ordinary civil cases. Taking into account that such pris-
oner cases account for a substantial portion of civil cases, in-
cluding these types of cases within the data might make a
substantial difference that is not of concern to this study.
Third, the data was limited to cases filed between 1990 and
September 30, 1997 (the last day of available data entry). Most
279. See supra note 275.
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district courts that "opted" into the mandatory disclosure rule
made this decision between 1994 and 1995. Thus, the interval
from 1990 to 1997 is sufficient to make a vertical comparison.
Fourth, the data regarding which district courts chose to adopt,
"opt out," or partially adopt the mandatory disclosure rule, and
when they did so was also included. This established the six
different types of district courts shown in Table 1.
2. The Censoring Problem
Because the data currently available from the Administra-
tive Office ends with cases filed on or before September 30,
1997, there is no information available concerning the outcome
of cases filed but not terminated before that date.280 With re-
spect to the two questions of concern, these pending cases would
cause systematic bias.
As to time to case disposition, cases filed later (closer to
September 30, 1997) would have a shorter time to disposition
than cases filed earlier for two reasons. First, the cases filed
later are more likely to be pending on September 30, 1997.
Therefore, no information about their time to case dispostion
would be available. However, later-filed cases with a final dis-
position would show a short duration because only those cases
that proceeded quickly could be both filed and disposed of before
September 30, 1997. Second, the earlier-filed cases are more
likely to contain cases lasting a long time. The later-filed cases
have not had as much time to last. These two factors tend to
show that cases filed later were systematically disposed of more
quickly than cases filed earlier. Without taking this problem
into account, the vertical comparison shows that cases in the
"post-opt-in" district courts proceeded significantly faster than
cases in the "pre-opt-in" district courts. This could be mistak-
enly deemed as evidence of the success of the mandatory disclo-
sure rule.
The data's systematic bias in this regard is shown in Table
2. It reports the mean time, in days, to dispose of a case, as well
280. See generally 11 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Guide to Judi-
ciary Policies and Procedures transmittal 64, at 11-18 to -28 (Mar. 1, 1985). For a
complete description of Administrative Office data, see Inter-University Consor-
tium for Political and Social Research, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base,
1970-1987, ICPSR 8429 (2d ed. Winter 1989 & Supps. 1990, 1992, & 1995).
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as the number of cases used to compute the mean. The first two
columns present the cases filed in all district courts, and the
last two columns show the cases filed in the district courts that
adopted the mandatory disclosure rule. This table clearly indi-
cates that in later filing years, the time to case disposition sys-
tematically decreases. This tendency is true both in all district
courts as well as in "opt-in" district courts. The obvious data
censoring cautions us to control for its effect in our vertical com-
parison model.
Table 2: Mean days needed for case disposition
Filing all district courts All district courts Opt- in district opt- in district
year for all cases* for cases without courts for all courts for cases
trial** cases*** without trial****
Mean Mean Mean Mean
days N days N days N days N
1990 360.67 (163,293) 349.95 (157,564) 370.97 (27,209) 356.54 (26,091)
1991 333.78 (173,034) 323.46 (167,436) 338.90 (27,687) 326.44 (26,696)
1992 318.36 (175,171) 308.94 (169,838) 321.73 (28,119) 309.88 (27,058)
1993 310.71 (168,177) 301.82 (162,979) 319.36 (27,806) 309.26 (26,817)
1994 295.26 (163,598) 287.77 (158,827) 302.99 (27,507) 294.10 (26,558)
1995 257.90 (167,636) 252.68 (163,619) 248.65 (32,630) 242.57 (31,838)
1996 185.71 (139,275) 183.74 (137,329) 198.07 (22,263) 196.01 (21,919)
1997 80.82 (46,641) 80.75 (46,478) 85.49 ( 7,502) 85.45 (7,469)
Total 303.80 (1,196,825) 280.91 (1,164,070) 293.45 (200,723) 283.70 (194,446)
* cases filed in all district courts and terminated by any method
** cases filed in all district courts and terminated without trial
*** cases filed in the district courts that opted into the mandatory disclosure
rule and terminated by any method
cases filed in the district courts that opted into the mandatory disclosure
rule and terminated without trial
***** the number within ( ) stands for the number of observations
Systematic bias also exists in the data with regard to the
trial rate; the data would show that cases filed later are less
likely to go to trial. Because the disposition time for cases going
to trial is longer than the disposition time for cases terminated
without trial, the cases filed later are less likely to be recorded
as terminated by trial. Cases filed earlier are more likely to
have enough time to go through the litigation process and to be
recorded in the data as terminated by trial. Without taking this
problem into consideration, it would, as a result, appear in the
vertical comparison model that the "post-opt-in" cases are much
less likely to go to trial than the "pre-opt-in" cases. Again, this
misleading showing would be the result of the systematic bias
caused by the problem of data censoring, rather than evidence
that mandatory disclosure reduces the trial rate. Table 3 shows
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the systematically biased results caused by the data being cen-
sored as of September 30, 1997. Although trial rates dramati-
cally decrease over time, this effect may be attributable to the
problems noted above.
Table 3: Trial rate
Filing Trial rate for cases in all Trial rate for cases in opt-in
year district courts district courts
1990 3.51% 4.11%
1991 3.24% 3.58%
1992 3.05% 3.77%
1993 .3.09% 3.56%
1994 2.91% 3.45%
1995 2.40% 2.43%
1996 1.40% 1.55%
1997 0.35% 0.44%
Total 2.74% 3.13%
* the number of observations are the same as that shown in Table 2
In sum, the problem of data censoring affects both the ques-
tion of whether mandatory disclosure facilitates the early reso-
lution of disputes as well as the question of whether it has any
effect on the trial rate. This is evident in that many court cases
were still pending on September 30, 1997, at the end date of the
data. There is nothing in the available data that indicates how
these pending cases will be resolved or how long it will take
them to terminate. The later the cases were filed, the more
likely they were still pending on September 30, 1997. Table 4
shows the rate of cases pending during different filing years for
the six different types of district courts. It should be noted that
substantially different case pending rates do not only exist in
the vertical model ("pre-opt-in" district courts versus "post-opt-
in" district courts), but also in the horizontal model among the
"post-opt-in," "post-opt-out," and "post-mixed" district courts.
As discussed below, this study takes different approaches to
eliminate the data-censoring problem's effect on the two
questions.
B. Time to Disposition
The mandatory disclosure rule sought to expedite the liti-
gation process by means of early exchange of core informa-
248 [Vol. 21:203
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol21/iss1/4
2000] MANDATORY DISCLOSURE 249
Table 4: Pending rate
Filing
year Pre-opt-in* Post-opt-in Pre-opt-out Post-opt-out Pre-mixed Post-mixed
1990 0.18%** # 0.17% # 0.33% #
(27,258)*** (0) (4154) (0) (3292) (0)
1991 0.26% # 0.25% # 0.65% #
(27,744) (0) (4484) (0) (3242) (0)
1992 0.39% # 0.37% # 1.03% #
(28,228) (0) (4598) (0) (3382) (0)
1993 0.98% 0.94% 1.51% 0% 2.18% 8.33%
(27,126) (955) (4479) (42) (3393) (48)
1994 2.53% 3.29% 3.46% 4.27% 2.60% 6.94%
(5720) (22677) (1070) (3212) (1424) (2161)
1995 15.18% 7.62% # 10.06% 2.34% 13.56%
(112) (35,218) (0) (3955) (128) (3524)
1996 # **** 27.89% # 28.50% # 34.13%
(0) (30,875) (0) (3263) (0) (3988)
1997 # 71.12% # 72.51% # 77.43%
(0) (25,976) (0) (2641) (0) (3593)
* the six types of district courts here correspond to those shown in Table 1.
** the percentage stands for the fraction of cases filed in that particular year but not
terminated before September 30, 1997.
*** the number within ( ) stands for the number of cases filed within particular district
courts in a certain year.
"#" indicates that no cases were filed and therefore no percentage is shown in this table.
tion.281 However, the data shows no such effect. 282 On the
contrary, the data tends to show that cases filed in the "post-
opt-in" district courts proceeded more slowly than cases filed in
the "post-opt-out" and "post-mixed" district courts.283
Two time periods are used to analyze the impact of
mandatory disclosure: first, the time to case disposition 284(the
general time) and, second, the time to case disposition for cases
disposed by settlement or pretrial disposition (the non-trial
time). In evaluating the effects of mandatory disclosure on case
duration, the non-trial time may be a better measure than the
general time since mandatory disclosure primarily influences
the pace of the discovery process, not the pace of trial. Never-
theless, it is still worth including the general time as a supple-
mental criterion to measure the effect of mandatory disclosure.
281. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1993).
282. See Appendix A at Regression 1-6.
283. See Appendix A at Regression 2-3.
284. Taking into account that this is notwithstanding whether or not the case
went to trial.
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1. The General Time Criterion
Before reporting the complicated statistical analysis, it is
helpful for descriptive purposes to present a simple tabulation
of case progress in the different types of district courts. After
excluding all cases pending on September 30, 1997 (without ac-
counting for caseload, case category, and filing year), Table 5
reports the percentage of all cases terminated within a certain
number of days, with or without trial.
Table 5: Percentage of cases terminated within certain
days (excluding cases pending September 30, 1997)
Days of case
disposition Post-opt-in Post-opt-out Post-mixed Pre-opt-in Pre-opt-out Pre-mixed
180* days 47.96%** 46.62% 45.34% 37.66% 36.97% 31.94%
270 days 66.56% 62.06% 60.18% 51.97% 49.33% 44.95%
360 days 78.38% 73.25% 71.61% 64.01% 59.60% 55.45%
450 days 86.82% 81.54% 80.08% 73.70% 68.89% 64.61%
540 days 92.13% 87.67% 86.98% 81.01% 76.37% 72.54%
630 days 95.41% 92.56% 92.05% 86.16% 81.38% 79.02%
720 days 97.28% 95.58% 95.05% 89.74% 85.72% 83.75%
810 days 98.53% 97.56% 97.40% 92.42% 89.05% 87.53%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
* The number stands for the number of days within which the case was terminated.
** The percentage stands for the fraction of cases terminated within certain days in the
particular type of district courts.
Table 5 shows that while more "post-opt-in" district courts
were terminated in a shorter period of time than the "post-opt-
out" district courts, the difference is not significantly great.
Moreover, Table 5 shows that the difference between the "pre-
opt-in" district courts and the "pre-opt-out" district courts ex-
isted before the mandatory disclosure issue came into play. For
example, while 78.38% of all cases filed in the "post-opt-in" dis-
trict courts were concluded within 360 days, 73.25% of all cases
filed in the "post-opt-out" district courts were disposed of within
the same number of days.28 5 However, a comparison between
"pre-opt-in" cases and "pre-opt-out" cases indicates that this dif-
ference cannot be used as proof that mandatory disclosure facil-
itates case disposition since 64.01% of all cases filed in the "pre-
opt-in" district courts and 59.60% of all cases filed in the "pre-
285. See supra Table 5.
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opt-out" district courts were terminated within 360 days.28 6
This result shows that other factors, besides the different dis-
trict courts' positions on mandatory disclosure, contribute to
this difference.
Similarly, the difference between the "pre-opt-in" cases and
the "post-opt-in" cases (for example, from 73.70% of all cases in
the "pre-opt-in" district courts to 86.82% of all cases in the
"post-opt-in" district courts terminated within 450 days) also
cannot be attributed to the adoption of mandatory disclosure in
these district courts shortening case duration since the same
difference exists between the "pre-opt-out" cases and the "post-
opt-out" cases (from 68.89% to 81.54%).287 Therefore, the cases
in the courts which do not adopt mandatory disclosure also go
faster after the mandatory disclosure comes into play. The fact
that the cases in the courts which adopt mandatory disclosure
go faster cannot be proof of the success of mandatory disclosure.
Some other factors control the result.
When viewed from a comparative perspective, Table 5 actu-
ally shows that mandatory disclosure does not have a signifi-
cant effect on time to disposition. However, the above
statistical analysis is too simple to be conclusive. Many impor-
tant variables, such as caseload and case category, are not
taken into consideration. Moreover, the censoring problem can-
not be resolved by simply disregarding the cases that are still
pending on September 30, 1997. These pending cases might be
disposed of more quickly or slowly than the cases terminated
before September 30, 1997 and would, therefore, significantly
change the results shown in the Table 5. Consequently, a more
sophisticated statistical technique is necessary to make an ac-
curate analysis.
Two models are used to evaluate the effect of mandatory
disclosure on time to disposition: the vertical comparison model
and the horizontal comparison model. In both models, multiple
regression can analyze the different duration of cases among
district courts with different disclosure rules, accounting for dif-
286. See supra Table 5.
287. See supra Table 5.
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ferent caseloads per judgeship and for case category at the same
time.288
In addition to multiple regression, two techniques handle
the problem of data censoring. First, the censored-normal re-
gression (a more sophisticated regression) is used to account for
cases pending on September 30, 1997.289 This censored-normal
regression is very useful, especially when the censoring rates
among the districts are comparable. Since the case pending
rates within the three district courts in the horizontal compari-
son model are similar in each filing year, the censored-normal
regression alone would be able to handle the censoring effect in
this model. In the vertical comparison model, however, there is
significant divergence of case-pending rates between the "post-
opt-in" district courts and the "pre-opt-in" district courts. Con-
sequently, a second technique is necessary. In order to account
for the effect of the filing year on the case pending rate and case
duration, the filing year is used as an explanatory variable in
the censored-normal regression.
In the vertical model, after accounting for caseload, case
category, censoring data, and filing year, a censored-normal re-
gression indicates that there is no statistically significant differ-
ence between the "pre-opt-in" district courts and the "post-opt-
in" districts courts concerning case duration. Among the
231,889 cases observed in this test, the result shows that cases
in the "post-opt-in" district courts are only 2.4 days faster than
cases in the "pre-opt-in" district courts. 290 This difference is not
statistically significant (p-value=0.311). The regression results
are reported in Appendix A as Regression 1.291
The distinction between cases in the courts that adopted
the "post-opt-in" rule and cases in the courts that adopted the
288. For a general introduction of multiple regression, see LAWRENCE C. HAM-
ILTON, REGRESSION WITH GRAPHICS: A SECOND COURSE IN APPLIED STATISTICS
(1992). For an introduction to using regression in comparing the time to case dis-
position between judge and jury trial, see Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Cler-
mont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Which is Speedier?, 79 JUDICATURE 176 (1996).
289. For utilizing censored-normal regression to handle the data censoring
problem, see Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An
Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 COR-
NELL L. REV. 967, 990 (1999).
290. See infra Appendix A at Regression 1.
291. See infra Appendix A at Regression 1.
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"pre-opt-in" rule is represented by a dummy variable in the
above regression. This tests only whether the intercept in the
regression model changed after adoption of mandatory disclo-
sure. There is a strong interaction between the dummy varia-
ble and the filing year variable; the "pre-opt-in" cases
systematically have an earlier filing year than the "post-opt-in"
cases. Therefore, a further test of the difference between the
"post-opt-in" cases and the "pre-opt-in" cases includes the inter-
action effect of the dummy variable and the filing year variable
in the regression model. This regression would show any
change in the coefficient of filing year after mandatory disclo-
sure and more effectively control for the introduction of
mandatory disclosure. Table 6 reports the regression results.
Table 6: Result of censored-normal regression of pre-
opt-in cases against post-opt-in cases
Dependent variable = mean days for case disposition
Variables coefficient p-value
Post-opt-in* -36244.84 .000
Filing year -12.215 .000
Interaction** 18.175 .000
Constant 24672.7 .000
Number of cases 231,889
Uncensored observations 200,723
Right-censored observations 31,166
Pseudo R2  .000
* dummy variable
** interaction-post-opt-in * filing year
The interaction term's coefficient measures the difference
over time between the "pre-opt-in" and "post-opt-in" cases. The
positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term
shows that the time to disposition tended to increase in the
"opt-in" districts. In the "pre-opt-in" district courts, later-filed
cases proceeded gradually faster, while in the "post-opt-in" dis-
trict courts later-filed cases proceeded at a gradually slower
rate. 292 This result tends to show that after the district courts
adopted the mandatory disclosure rule, the average time to dis-
292. See supra Table 6.
2000] 253
51
PACE LAW REVIEW
position of a case increased. 293 While the difference is statisti-
cally significant (p-value=0.000), because of the size of the
increase, i.e., six days longer per year (after subtracting the
negative intercept), this result may not warrant the conclusion
that mandatory disclosure increases the time to case disposi-
tion. Nevertheless, it reinforces the result reached by the previ-
ous test. The speed of case disposition is not improved by the
mandatory disclosure rule.
In the horizontal comparison model, a censored-normal re-
gression, controlling for caseload, case category, and censoring
data, leads to the same conclusion.294 A simple horizontal com-
parison between the "post-opt-in," "post-opt-out," and "post-
mixed" district courts, with 142,128 cases observed, shows that
the time to disposition in the "post-opt-in" district courts is 23
days shorter than in the "post-opt-out" district courts and is 50
days shorter than in the "post-mixed" district courts. However,
as explained above, this difference alone does not conclusively
show that the mandatory disclosure rule has been successful.
295
It is possible that there is another variable between the three
types of district courts, besides mandatory disclosure, that
would account for this difference in time to disposition. There-
fore, a parallel horizontal comparison is necessary to examine
this possibility.
A parallel horizontal comparison between the "pre-opt-in,"
"pre-opt-out," and "pre-mixed" district courts rebuts the superfi-
cial result of the simple horizontal comparison. 296 In this paral-
lel comparison, with 149,833 cases observed, the time to case
disposition in the "pre-opt-in" district courts is 62 days shorter
than in the "pre-opt-out" district courts and is 86 days shorter
than in the "pre-mixed" district courts. 297 This parallel compar-
ison reveals that even before the mandatory disclosure issue
came into play, there were already differences in time to case
disposition among these districts.298 Since this already existed,
factors other than the mandatory disclosure rule must have led
293. See supra Table 6.
294. See infra Appendix A at Regression 2.
295. See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
296. See infra Appendix A at Regression 3.
297. See infra Appendix A at Regression 3.
298. See infra Appendix A at Regression 2-3.
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to this difference. The regression results of the above two hori-
zontal comparisons are reported in Appendix A as Regression 2
and Regression 3, respectively.
Viewed together, the two horizontal comparisons show that
the advantage of the "pre-opt-in" district courts over the other
two types of district courts, in terms of time to disposition, less-
ened after they adopted the mandatory disclosure rule (over
"opt-out" district courts, from 62 days to 23 days; over mixed
district courts, from 86 days to 50 days).299 The time to disposi-
tion became longer in these district courts after they adopted
the mandatory disclosure rule. This result is consistent with
the result observed in the vertical comparison model.300 Thus,
in over 100,000 observed cases, no evidence shows that
mandatory disclosure shortens the time to case disposition. On
the contrary, the over-all data tends to indicate that cases pro-
ceeded slightly slower in the district courts that had adopted
the mandatory disclosure rule.
2. The Non-trial Time Criterion
Another comparison focuses on cases terminated without a
trial, either through settlement or through other pretrial dispo-
sitions. In evaluating the effects of the mandatory disclosure
rule, this criterion is superior to the general time-to-disposition
canon because it gives a more precise picture of how mandatory
disclosure affects the pace of the pretrial process.
The same data-censoring problem existed in this test.30 1
Unfortunately, the censored-normal regression cannot be used
here to resolve the problem because it is not clear whether those
pending cases are going to be disposed by trial or otherwise.
Therefore, there is insufficient information about the censored
data, and, consequently, a different technique must be used
here.
Because the later-filed cases shown in the data are only a
small portion of cases and were terminated relatively faster,
while the earlier-filed cases proceeded for a long time and are
more likely to be shown in the data, the most effective way to
299. The number here means relative advantage, not the real day.
300. See infra Appendix A at Regression 1.
301. See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
2000] 255
53
PACE LAW REVIEW
eliminate this effect is to allow earlier-filed cases and later-filed
cases to have the same time interval to be terminated and have
the same chance to be recorded in the data. To implement this
control, cases observed are limited to cases filed during 1993
and 1994 and the maximum time for case disposition is set at
1,000 days. This limitation enables every case filed on any day
during 1993 and 1994 to have an equally long period of time to
be terminated and the result completely reflected in the data.
This restriction can effectively eliminate the systematic bias
that earlier-filed cases will tend to have a longer case-disposi-
tion time because they started before September 30, 1997. Ad-
mittedly, this control will exclude the cases that took more than
1,000 days, which would ordinarily be relevant to this study,
but there are sufficient reasons to believe that this exclusion
would not bias the result. First, cases disposed within 1,000
days account for over 95% of all cases disposed without trial. 30 2
Second, this exclusion is even-handedly conducted in all com-
pared district courts. It seems highly unlikely that the different
positions on the mandatory disclosure rule would result in par-
ticular district courts having more cases proceeding longer than
1,000 days. Therefore, excluding these cases will not prejudice
this study.
With this limitation, the vertical comparison model, with
52,173 cases observed, shows that the time to case disposition
in the "post-opt-in" district courts is only 1.8 days shorter than
in the "pre-opt-in" district courts. 30 3 More important, this dif-
ference is not statistically significant (p-value=0.341). 30 4 This
result indicates that there is no statistically meaningful short-
ening of the pretrial process after the district courts adopted the
mandatory disclosure rule.30 5 The regression results are re-
ported in Appendix A as Regression 4.
The basic horizontal comparison model, with 26,648 cases
observed, shows that the time-to-case disposition in the "post-
opt-in" district courts is 27 days shorter than in the "post-opt-
out" district courts and 62 days shorter than in the "post-mixed"
302. See supra Table 5.
303. See infra Appendix A at Regression 4.
304. See infra Appendix A at Regression 4.
305. See infra Appendix A at Regression 4.
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district courts. 30 6 Again, this result does not, definitively, show
that the mandatory disclosure rule works. It is still necessary to
run the parallel horizontal comparison model.
In the parallel horizontal comparison model, the same
1,000-day limitation is imposed as in the previous study.30 7
However, in order to increase the number of cases observed, the
data set includes cases filed before 1994 instead of only during
1993 and 1994. Therefore, the fact that these cases were filed
earlier should not bias the result. With more cases observed in
this model, it accurately reflects the situation within these dis-
trict courts before the mandatory disclosure issue came into
play. Accordingly, with 129,574 cases observed, the regression
shows that the time-to-case disposition in the "pre-opt-in" dis-
trict courts is 37 days shorter than in the "pre-opt-out" district
courts and is 55 days shorter than in the "pre-mixed" district
courts.30 8 These results indicate that, even before the district
courts chose their respective positions on the mandatory disclo-
sure issue, cases in the "opt-in" district courts proceeded faster
than in the other two types of district courts.30 9 While there is
some difference between the basic horizontal comparison model
and the parallel horizontal model, the difference is not statisti-
cally significant. 310 The regression results of the two horizontal
comparisons are reported in Appendix A as Regression 5 and
Regression 6.3 11
These results are consistent with the outcome reached with
the vertical comparison model. They strengthen the finding ob-
served above. In cases terminated without a trial, there is no
evidence showing that mandatory disclosure shortens the time
to disposition.
C. Trial rate
The trial rate referred to here refers to the percentage of
cases terminated by either a jury verdict, directed verdict, or a
306. See infra Appendix A at Regression 5.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 301-303.
308. See infra Appendix A at Regression 6.
309. See infra Appendix A at Regression 6.
310. See infra Appendix A at Regression 5 and 6.
311. See infra Appendix A at Regression 5 and Regression 6.
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judge-trial judgment.312 This criterion is established to indicate
how many cases were not terminated by settlement or other
pretrial rulings and, therefore, entered into the trial process. In
evaluating the effect of mandatory disclosure, "settlement rate"
is a better criterion than "trial rate."313 However, because many
cases that were actually terminated by settlement were re-
corded in the official data as being terminated by many other
methods, 314 it is not practical to sort out the 'real' settlement
rate from the official data.315  Nevertheless, since the
mandatory disclosure rule is not likely to affect the rate of dis-
missal by rulings on legal issues, the trial rate is still a valid
indication of the settlement rate.
In testing the trial rate in both the vertical comparison
model and in the horizontal comparison model, the target of in-
terest is the probability that trial occurs. This requires a statis-
tical model with a dichotomous variable, unlike the time to
disposition, which is a continuous variable. Thus, the above re-
gression techniques cannot be used.31 6 In addition, the data-
censoring problem discussed above also exists in this trial rate
comparison. 31 7 The "survival time proportional hazard model"
is a recognized statistical model used to predict the probability
312. The official data divides the methods of case disposition into nine catego-
ries including: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) other dismissal, (3) default judgment, (4)
consent judgment, (5) pre-trial motion, (6) jury verdict, (7) directed verdict, (8)
judge-trial judgment, and (9) others. The trial rate reported in this research in-
cludes the cases disposed of by jury verdict, directed verdict, and judge-trial judg-
ment. For a description of the data, see 11 Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures transmittal 64, at 11-18 to -28
(Mar. 1, 1985).
313. The goal of mandatory disclosure is to promote settlement. Moreover,
the decrease of trial rate does not necessarily mean the increase of settlement rate
because many cases may be disposed of by other means, such as summary
judgement.
314. An example of this is found in other dismissals.
315. The rate of consent judgment reported in the official data does not reflect
the actual settlement rate because many cases, while actually settled, are disposed
of by the plaintiffs dismissal of the case and are hidden in the category of "other
dismissal[s]." There is no way to tell under the "other dismissal" category how
many cases are dismissed without a settlement or how many cases are dismissed
with a settlement. It would be a mistake to treat the category of consent judgment
as the number of cases actually settled.
316. The technique of regression can only be used to deal with continuous
variables and is not capable of accommodating a dichotomous variable. See gener-
ally Hamilton, supra note 288.
317. See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
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of the occurrence of a particular event and to control the cen-
sored data.318 Among the several models within the survival
time proportional hazard technique, the Cox model is the most
appropriate one for our purpose. 319 Since the event of interest
in our comparison test is trial, trial is set as the failure event in
the Cox proportional hazard model.32
0
In the vertical comparison model,32' the Cox proportional
hazard model shows that cases filed in the "pre-opt-in" district
courts were only slightly more likely to go to trial than cases
filed in the "post-opt-in" district courts (hazard ratio322=1.05).
This difference is not statistically significant (p-value=0.309).
This result indicates that there has been no statistically signifi-
cant change in the rate of cases going to trial since the district
318. See generally DAVID G. KLEINBAUM, SuRvIvAL ANALYsis: A SELF-LEARN-
ING TEXT (1996). This model has been utilized to analyze the probability question
with censored data in a different legal issue. See id. See also John Blume & Theo-
dore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection: An
Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 492-99 (1999) (using the survival time
proportional hazard model to observe the probability of grants of relief from death
penalties).
319. For an introduction to the Cox proportional hazards model, see
Kleinbaum, supra note 318, at 86. The Cox model is a popular mathematical de-
vice used for analyzing survival data. The focus is not only on the model form, but
also on why the model is popular. See id. The Cox model also focuses on "the
maximum likelihood estimation of the model parameters, the formula for the haz-
ard ratio, how to obtain adjusted survival curves, and the meaning of the PH as-
sumption." Id. Furthermore, three statistical objectives are typically considered:
(1) test for significance, (2) point estimate of the effect, and (3) confidence interval
for this effect. See id. at 90.
A key reason that the Cox model is popular and most appropriate for our uses
is because "even though the baseline is not specified, reasonably good estimates of
regression co-efficients, hazard ratios of interest, and adjusted survival curves can
be obtained for a wide variety of data situations." Id. at 96. In other words, the
results of the Cox model will closely "approximate the results for the correct para-
metric model." Id. Lastly, the Cox model uses more information and is especially
favored when survival time information is available and there is censoring. See id.
at 98.
320. For an explanation on how the Cox model works, see supra note 319.
321. The vertical comparison model entails 230,061 cases observed and con-
trolling for caseload, case category, censored data, and filing year.
322. The hazard ratio is the index of the variable's effect on the probability of
occurrence of the event of interest. A hazard ratio of 1 indicates that the variable
("pre-opt-in") has no effect at all. A hazard ratio of 10 means that the cases in the
"pre-opt-in" district courts are ten times more likely than cases in the "post-opt-in"
district courts to go to trial. A hazard ratio of 0.1 means that cases in the "pre-opt-
in" district courts are one-tenth as likely to go to trial as cases in the "post-opt-in"
district courts.
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courts adopted the mandatory disclosure rule. The results of
this Cox proportional hazard model are reported in Appendix B
as Cox 1.
In the basic horizontal comparison model, with 140,985
cases observed and controlling for all of the factors mentioned
above, the Cox proportional hazard model shows that cases filed
in the "post-opt-out" district courts and in the "post-mixed" dis-
trict courts were both slightly less likely to go to trial than cases
filed in the "post-opt-in" district courts. 323 Again, this observa-
tion alone does not prove that cases filed in the "post-opt-in"
district courts are more likely to go to trial than cases filed in
the other two types of district courts. 324
A parallel horizontal comparison 325 reveals that before the
mandatory disclosure issue came into play, cases filed in the
"opt-in" district courts were more likely to go to trial.326 The
Cox proportional hazard model shows that cases filed in the
"pre-opt-out" district courts and in the "pre-mixed" district
courts were also slightly less likely to go to trial than were cases
filed in the "pre-opt-in" district courts, with a hazard ratio 0.63
and 0.64 respectively. 327 Although there is some difference in
the hazard ratio between the basic and the parallel horizontal
comparison, the difference is too small to be statistically
significant.
The results of the two horizontal comparison models con-
firm the results of the vertical comparison model.328 Both indi-
cate that there is no statistically significant difference in the
trial rate among different types of district courts.329 The results
of the Cox model in the two horizontal comparisons are reported
in Appendix B as Cox 2 and Cox 3.330
In order to increase the reliability of the above conclusion,
another testing model is used to examine the influence of
323. See infra Appendix B at Cox 2. The hazard ratio is 0.76 and 0.66, respec-
tively. See id.
324. See discussion supra Part V.A.
325. See infra Appendix B at Cox 3. The parallel horizontal comparison en-
tails 148,875 cases observed and all relevant factors controlled for. See id.
326. See infra Appendix B at Cox 3.
327. See infra Appendix B at Cox 3.
328. See infra Appendix B at Cox 1.
329. See infra Appendix B at Cox 1, 2, and 3.
330. See infra Appendix B at Cox 2 and 3.
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mandatory disclosure on the trial rate. The statistical model
used here is the logistic regression. Logistic regression is an-
other recognized technique for dichotomous data.33'
The drawback of using a logistic regression here is that it,
alone, cannot handle the problem of data censoring. A possible
control to compensate for this fact is to limit the cases observed
to cases that are filed relatively early.332 The difficulty of utiliz-
ing this control in our data is that the time from the adoption of
the mandatory disclosure rule until the ending date of the offi-
cial data that is available for this study is not long enough to
reduce the rate of pending cases to an insignificant level.3 3 3 As
shown in Table 4, the pending rate for cases filed in 1994 in
different types of districts ranges from 2.60% to 6.94%, while
the average trial rate is only about 4% 334 On the other hand,
limiting to those cases filed in 1993 poses the problem that the
number of cases filed in the three "post" groups of districts is too
small to make a meaningful statistical comparison.
In order to overcome this difficulty, a multiple-control ap-
proach is imposed in this analysis upon both the vertical and
horizontal comparison models. The cases observed are limited
to cases filed during 1993 and 1994 in order to ensure that the
number of the cases is great enough to make a statistically
meaningful observation. The cases observed are further re-
stricted to cases which were terminated within 1,000 days in
order to ensure that the pending rate would not bias the result.
This control is not merely to discard the pending cases. It also
drops the cases that were disposed of, by any method, after
1,000 days. In other words, this 1,000-day control even-
handedly drops all cases that lasted over 1,000 days regardless
of whether the cases were pending or not. In spite of dropping
these extraordinarily long cases, the cases observed still ac-
count for over 95% of all cases filed during the two years, main-
taining the statistical importance of this test.
331. See HAMILTON, supra note 288, at 217-47.
332. This control has been used in some trial rate research with censored
data. See Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothe-
sis: Case Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON. 92, 103-06 (1997).
333. See supra Table 4.
334. See supra Table 4.
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Under the multiple-control approach utilized in the vertical
comparison model, the logistic regression shows that there is no
statistically significant difference, in terms of trial rate, be-
tween the cases filed in the "post-opt-in" and "pre-opt-in" dis-
trict courts. The multiple control approach entails 51,561 cases
observed and controls for caseload and case category. The same
result is shown in the horizontal comparison model, where the
logistic regression indicates that the trial rates in the different
types of district courts are not significantly different. This sup-
plemental testing method of logistic regression confirms the re-
sult obtained in the Cox proportional hazard model.
VI. Conclusion
In general, the empirical research in this Article, the Rand
report, and the FJC report do not present any evidence that
mandatory disclosure achieved its intended goals of expediting
the disposition of cases and saving litigation costs. 335 On the
other hand, these empirical studies also show that the criti-
cisms of mandatory disclosure, including proliferation of satel-
lite litigation and frustration of settlements, are unfounded.3 36
In particular, the Rand report illustrates that mandatory
disclosure neither increases the satellite litigation nor affects
attorneys' views on fairness.33 7 Additionally, the Rand report
presents no evidence supporting the proposition that
mandatory disclosure increases litigation costs or changes the
time to case disposition.338 The FJC report further demon-
strates that most attorneys do not think that initial disclosure
has any significant effect. 339 Among the minority of attorneys
who think initial disclosure does have some effect, more attor-
neys believe that the effect was positive. 340 The FJC report also
reinforces the Rand report's finding that mandatory disclosure
does not proliferate satellite litigation.341
335. See discussion supra Parts IV and V.
336. See discussion supra Parts IV and V.
337. See discussion supra Parts N.A.
338. See id.
339. See FJC REPORT, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
341. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
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The empirical research in this Article, based upon the
docket data, shows that mandatory disclosure neither expedites
the litigation process nor promotes the trial rate. 342 Both the
results of the vertical comparison and the horizontal compari-
son after the district courts adopted the mandatory disclosure
rule indicate that cases proceeded relatively more slowly. 343
The difference of time to disposition between the "pre-opt-in"
district courts and the "post-opt-in" district courts, however, is
small.344 In cases terminated without a trial, the analysis
shows that there is no statistically significant change of time to
disposition after the district courts adopted the mandatory dis-
closure rule.345 The Cox proportional hazard model, in both the
vertical comparison and the horizontal comparison, reports that
there is no statistically significant difference in trial rate among
different types of district courts. 346 The test of logistic regres-
sion reaches the same conclusion. 347
These empirical results are consistent with this Article's
analysis from both the traditional legal arguments and the law
and economics perspective. 348 Both the proponents and oppo-
nents of mandatory disclosure appear to overstate its advan-
tages and disadvantages. 349 An objective and appropriate
description of the current mandatory disclosure rule is that it is
a controversial device with no practical effects.
An important question remains unanswered by any empiri-
cal research: what is the effect of mandatory disclosure on cases
that do not call for any discovery? The theoretical analysis pro-
vided in this Article suggests that it would cause systematic
overproduction of unnecessary information and result in waste-
ful litigation costs, 350 unless the parties agree to spare each
other the trouble of disclosing unneeded information. Although
there is no evidence showing parties cannot reach such an
agreement under these circumstances, sound rulemaking cer-
342. See discussion supra Part V.
343. See discussion supra Part V.B.
344. See discussion supra Part V.B.
345. See discussion supra Part V.B.2.
346. See discussion supra Part V.C.
347. See discussion supra Part V.C.
348. See discussion supra Parts II and 1II.
349. See discussion supra Part I.
350. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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tainly should not depend on the cooperation of the parties to
avoid its adverse effects. From this perspective, the pending
amendment that excludes certain types of cases, i.e., those un-
likely to have any discovery at all, from the coverage of the
mandatory disclosure rule seems to move in the right direction.
But why should the amendment not entirely eliminate such
an ineffective rule altogether? Since mandatory disclosure
brings no perceived benefits to the discovery process, a wise
course would be to abolish this redundant device. Although it
might be politically more feasible to narrow its application and
save some embarrassment, facing the mistake and correcting it
would certainly be more desirable.
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Appendix A
Regression 1: censored-normal regression of vertical
comparison
dependent variable = mean days for case disposition
Variables Coefficient p-value
post-opt-in* -.2.409 .311
caseloads -.007 .165
filing year -7.311 .000
[case category]** omitted omitted
constants 14777.1 .000
number of cases 231,889
uncensored observations 200,723
right-censored observations 31,166
pseudo R2  .005
* dummy variable
** there are 85 variables accounting for case category which are unimportant for
present purpose and therefore are omitted
Regression 2: censored-normal regression of basic
horizontal comparison
dependent variable = mean days for case disposition
Variables Coefficient p-value
post-opt-out* 22.891 .000
post-mixed* 50.147 .000
caseloads -.052 .000
[case category] omitted omitted
constants 300.281 .209
number of cases 142,128
uncensored observations 103,450
right-censored observations 38,678
pseudo R2  .008
* both are dummy variables
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Regression 3: censored-normal regression of parallel
horizontal comparison
dependent variable = mean days for case disposition
Variables Coefficient p-value
pre-opt-out* 62.302 .000
pre-mixed* 86.632 .000
caseloads .117 .000
[case category] omitted omitted
constants 409.403 .203
number of cases 149,833
uncensored observations 148,869
right-censored observations 964
pseudo R 2  .005
* both are dummy variables
Regression 4: regression of vertical comparison
dependent variable = mean days for case disposition
Variables Coefficient p-value
pre-opt-out* 1.801 .341
caseloads .007 .564
constants 277.793 .000
number of cases 52,173
adjusted R 2  .069
* dummy variable
Regression 5: regression of basic horizontal
comparison
dependent variable = mean days for case disposition
Variables Coefficient p-value
post-opt-out* 26.591 .000
post-mixed* 61.789 .000
caseloads -.045 .032
constants 300.206 .000
number of cases 26,648
adjusted R2  .074
* both are dummy variables
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Regression 6: regression of parallel horizontal
comparison
dependent variable = mean days for case disposition
Variables Coefficient p-value
pre-opt-out* 37.998 .000
pre-mixed* 55.036 .000
caseloads .104 .000
caseloads 241.539 .000
number of cases 129,574
adjusted R2  .074
* both are dummy variables
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Appendix B
Cox 1: The Cox model of vertical comparison
dependent variable = mean days for case disposition
Variables hazard ratio p-value
pre-opt-in* 1.049 .309
caseloads -.999 .000
filing year 1.010 .378
[case category]** omitted omitted
number of cases 230,061
* DUMMY VARIABLE
** there are 85 variables accounting for case category which are unimportant for
present purpose and therefore are omitted
Cox 2: The Cox model of basic horizontal comparison
dependent variable = mean days for case disposition
Variables hazard ratio p-value
post-opt-out* .761 .000
post-mixed* .660 .000
caseloads .999 .000
filing year .965 .196
[case category] omitted omitted
number of cases 140,985
* both are dummy variables
Cox 3: The Cox model of parallel horizontal comparison
dependent variable = mean days for case disposition
Variables hazard ratiop-value
pre-opt-out* .627 .000
pre-mixed* .642 .000
caseloads .999 .000
filing year 1.022 .053
[case category] omitted omitted
number of cases 148,875
* both are dummy variables
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